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The demand for qualified directors to serve in audit committee chair and designated 
financial expert positions has grown in recent years, increasing the number of these directors that 
serve on multiple audit committees. Past research has examined the effect of these directors 
holding multiple audit committee seats on audit committee effectiveness, but no studies to date 
have examined how these directors allocate their monitoring effort across their multiple audit 
committee seats. Using a sample of audit committee chairs and financial experts that serve on 
multiple audit committees from 2004-2014, I examine whether the reputation incentives for these 
directors are associated with audit committee effectiveness at the firms they serve. Reputation 
incentives theory suggests that these directors will allocate more monitoring effort to the firms in 
their portfolio that offer them a greater opportunity to enhance their reputation as a monitor 
(higher reputation incentives). Consistent with this theory, I find that audit committee 
effectiveness is higher at firms that offer these directors high reputation incentives as compared 
to firms that do not. My results suggest that these directors exert varying levels of monitoring 
effort based on the relative importance of any one audit committee to their portfolio of audit 
committees. My findings should be of interest to boards, investors, and regulators considering 
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Economic theory posits that the reputation incentives of players influence their actions 
(Wilson 1985; Weigelt and Camerer 1988). As it relates to situations involving agency problems, 
analytical research presents strong support for the theory that reputation incentives can induce 
the agent to act in the interest of the principal (Fama 1980; Stiglitz and Weiss 1983; Kose and 
Nachman 1985; Diamond 1989, 1991). Empirical research supports this notion and finds that 
reputation incentives affect the actions of various agents including auditors (Reynolds and 
Francis 2000; Larcker and Richardson 2004), analysts (Jackson 2005; Ljungqvist et al. 2007), 
and underwriters (Carter and Manaster 1990; Carter, Dark, and Singh 1998). 
Recent studies examine the effect of the reputation incentives of directors with multiple 
directorships on firm performance (Masulis and Mobbs 2014) and firm cost of debt capital 
(Huang et al. 2017). However, there is no research to date examining the effect of the reputation 
incentives of such directors on financial reporting quality (FRQ).1 In this study, I examine 
whether the reputation incentives of two director roles in particular - the audit committee chair 
and the designated financial expert (collectively, “key audit committee members”) affect FRQ. 
The audit committee is the primary corporate governance mechanism put in place to monitor the 
accounting and financial reporting processes at public companies (Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX] 
2002; Beasley et al. 2009). Because audit committee chairs and designated financial experts are 
the primary individuals driving the committee’s efforts to monitor FRQ (DeFond et al. 2005; 
Carcello et al. 2011a; National Association for Corporate Directors [NACD] 2014; Tanyi and 
Smith 2015), examining whether the reputation incentives of these directors that serve on 
                                                
1 Cao et al. (2012) examine the effect of company reputation on FRQ. While they do not examine the reputation 
effects of any one agent of the firm, they acknowledge that the effect of company reputation likely manifests itself 
through the actions of various agents including directors, executives, or auditors. 
 2 
multiple audit committees affect FRQ is important. Any effect on FRQ is important because 
FRQ can affect the efficiency of a firm’s capital allocation decisions (Biddle et al. 2009), stock 
liquidity (Daske et al. 2008), cost of capital (Francis et al. 2004), and even audit fees (Abbott et 
al. 2006; Feldmann et al. 2009). 
Reputation incentives theory, in the context of corporate directors, suggests that a 
director’s reputation is the strongest incentive that motivates a director to be an effective monitor 
because reputation affects a director’s marketability and opportunities to gain additional 
directorships in the future (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Yermack 2004; Srinivasan 2005; 
Fich and Shivdasani 2007). Because there is a strong incentive to build a reputation as an 
effective monitor, directors with multiple directorships should exert the most monitoring effort to 
their directorships offering them the most prestige and the most visibility to build a reputation as 
an effective monitor (Masulis and Mobbs 2014). Thus, as it relates to key audit committee 
directors, reputation incentives theory supports the notion that these directors that serve on 
multiple audit committees will exert more monitoring effort on the audit committees offering 
them the highest reputation incentives, leading to higher FRQ. This study examines whether 
there is empirical evidence to support this notion. 
Using BoardEx data from 2004-2014, I identify all directors that are audit committee 
chairs or designated financial experts. I restrict my analysis to the directors that serve on multiple 
boards in key audit committee roles and, following Masulis and Mobbs (2014), I use firm size 
relative to the size of other companies that the director serves as a proxy for reputation 
incentives.2 I hold the director constant using director fixed effects and estimate analyses at the 
director-firm-year level, so that FRQ is relative to other boards on which the director serves in 
                                                
2 To ensure that the additional board assignment is significant, I do not count firms with less than $1,000,000 in total 
assets or firms that are a subsidiary of a company that the director serves as an additional board.  
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the same fiscal year.3 I use misstatements of annual financial statements, material weaknesses in 
internal controls over financial reporting quality, performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, 
and the F-Score as proxies for FRQ. On average, I find that even after controlling for absolute 
firm size and a host of other firm characteristics, firms that offer key audit committee directors 
high reputation incentives have significantly higher FRQ, indicating higher audit committee 
effectiveness. These results are robust to several alternative measures of reputation incentives. 
I perform cross-sectional analysis to investigate whether the effect of director reputation 
incentives on FRQ differs between smaller firms and larger firms. I find that my results are 
driven by smaller firms. This suggests that director reputation incentives do not matter for FRQ 
at the largest firms, likely because those firms may have good FRQ regardless of the relative 
level of reputation incentives offered to key audit committee directors. Director reputation 
incentives only matter for FRQ at smaller firms that rely more on the input and effort of key 
audit committee directors. 
This study contributes to several streams of literature in accounting and corporate 
governance. First, this study contributes to the audit committee effectiveness literature by 
documenting an attribute of the audit committee beyond expertise and independence that has an 
impact on how effective the audit committee is at monitoring FRQ. Second, this study 
contributes to the director reputation literature. The director reputation literature has documented 
that the reputation incentives of independent directors with multiple directorships affect firm 
performance and cost of capital (Masulis and Mobbs 2014; Huang et al. 2017). My study extends 
this literature and documents a positive relation between the reputation incentives of key audit 
committee directors that serve on multiple audit committees and another firm outcome - financial 
                                                
3 Since I am only examining directors that serve on two or more boards, each director is associated with at least two 
different firms in each year. 
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reporting quality. Finally, because my study examines reputation incentives in a setting where 
key audit committee directors serve on multiple audit committees, I indirectly contribute to the 
literature on director busyness. Past studies on director busyness measure busyness by adding the 
total number of directorships held, and implicitly assume that directors allocate their monitoring 
effort equally across each of their directorships (Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Sharma and Iselin 
2012; Masulis and Mobbs 2014; Tanyi and Smith 2015). My results offer a more intricate view 
into effort allocation and show that directors serving on multiple audit committees distribute 
their monitoring effort based on the company’s relative contribution to their reputation. 
This study has implications for practice as well. Over the last decade, proxy advisory 
firms and investors have expressed concerns about directors becoming too busy from being over-
boarded (ISS 2015a; ISS 2015b). These concerns have become particularly relevant to the audit 
committee, where the bulk of the increase in workload has occurred since the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (Spencer Stuart 2015, 26). This study offers another factor for boards, proxy advisory firms, 
and investors to consider when evaluating the number of boards that directors serve. Boards at 
smaller public companies should consider the other firms that any potentially new audit 
committee directors serve on before they appoint them. While appointing an audit committee 
director from another larger, more visible firm may seem appealing, it may not result in a more 
effective audit committee for such firms. Along the same lines, smaller public companies might 
benefit from setting clear restrictions on both the number and the scale of outside commitments 
they will allow existing directors to have while they serve on the board. The relative size of the 
company compared to the other companies that a director serves can act as a signal to investors 
and boards about the potential quality of financial reporting monitoring that will be provided. 
 5 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a literature review 
and develops my hypotheses. Section III discusses my empirical models and sample 
construction. Section IV presents my main results and the results of additional tests. Finally, 
Section V concludes.  
 6 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Reputation Literature Review 
Past research uses game theory to show that the reputation of players influences their 
actions (Wilson 1985; Weigelt and Camerer 1988). In a game where a participant holds inside 
information about his “type,” other participants determine his type by evaluating the participant’s 
reputation, which is based on his past actions. The participant knows this and chooses his actions 
carefully to maximize his utility. This effect that reputation has on the chosen action of the 
participant is referred to as the “reputation effect” or “reputation incentives.”5 Analytical 
research has examined reputation incentives as a mechanism to mitigate agency problems and 
has found that reputation incentives can strongly motivate the agent to act in the interest of the 
principal (Fama 1980; Holmstrom 1982; Stiglitz and Weiss 1983; Kose and Nachman 1985; 
Diamond 1989, 1991; Gomes 2000).  
Empirical research also supports the notion that reputation incentives affect the actions of 
various agents. For example, past empirical work finds that, due to reputational concerns, 
analysts are less optimistic in their earnings forecasts (Jackson 2005), drop their buy 
recommendations for stocks more abruptly (Fang and Yasuda 2011), and keep their stock 
evaluations consistent after they transition to new employers (Clarke et al. 2007). Underwriters 
and brokerage firms act in a manner indicative of reputation preservation as well (Jo et al. 2007; 
Ljungqvist et al. 2007). 
Auditing research finds that reputation incentives are important for auditors. Damage to 
the reputation of an audit firm can lead to significant financial downsizing at the audit firm due 
to loss of clients (Barton 2005; Jensen 2006). Audit firms know this and act accordingly to 
                                                
5 Recent work on director reputation refers to this effect as “reputation incentives,” so that is how I refer to this 
effect throughout the paper. 
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preserve their reputation in the market for audit services. For example, auditors are more 
conservative in their audit approach for their relatively larger, more important clients and are less 
pliable in their decision of whether to permit them to use abnormal accruals to manage earnings 
(Reynolds and Francis 2000; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Larcker and Richardson 2004). There is 
also experimental work that supports the argument that auditors take steps to defend and protect 
their reputation (Mayhew 2001).  
Most directly relevant to this study is the stream of literature focusing on the reputation 
incentives of corporate directors. As discussed above, analytical research argues that reputation 
is one of the strongest motivators for agents, or directors in this case, to act in the interest of the 
principal (Fama 1980). Consistent with this argument, empirical research finds evidence of 
reputational penalties for directors at companies experiencing financial fraud and accounting 
failures (Srinivasan 2005; Fich and Shivdasani 2007; Brochet and Srinivasan 2014). Other 
studies find negative effects on director reputation when companies cut dividend payments 
(Kaplan and Reishus 1990), experience poor financial condition (Gilson 1990), go through 
liquidation (Harford 2003), or report poor performance (Yermack 2004). More recent research 
examines how directors with multiple directorships allocate monitoring effort, knowing that 
these reputation penalties can occur for poor monitoring. Masulis and Mobbs (2014) find that 
independent directors with multiple directorships allocate more monitoring effort to their 
relatively larger, more important firms, resulting in higher performance and higher likelihood of 
forced CEO departure following poor performance at these firms. They do this, presumably, 
because good monitoring at their more important firms will likely make a greater contribution to 
their reputation as an effective monitor. 
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While Masulis and Mobbs (2014) provide evidence that the reputation incentives of 
directors with multiple directorships can affect firm performance, there is no evidence about 
whether the reputation incentives of directors with multiple directorships affect financial 
reporting quality. In this study, I fill that gap by specifically examining whether directors that sit 
on multiple audit committees allocate their monitoring effort unevenly across those audit 
committees. 
Demand for Monitors of Financial Reporting and Multiple Directorships 
 The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 brought about numerous regulations 
aimed at improving corporate governance at publicly traded companies in the U.S. Many of these 
regulations were focused on making parties that play a key role in the financial reporting process 
more effective, including the audit committee. After SOX passed, demand for directors with the 
financial expertise that is required to serve on an audit committee increased significantly (DeFond 
et al. 2005; Engel et al. 2010). At the same time, the required workload and risk for these directors 
increased as well. Audit committees meet much more frequently and for longer periods of time 
since SOX was passed and liability insurance premiums for directors are higher as well (Linck et 
al. 2008; Beasley et al. 2009). This, coupled with stringent audit committee independence rules 
that were mandated by SOX, decreased the supply of qualified and eligible directors that could 
serve on an audit committee (Linck et al. 2008). As a result, many companies were faced with a 
limited pool of potential candidates from which they could select directors for the audit committee, 
causing an increase in the number of directors that serve on multiple audit committees (Tanyi and 
Smith 2015). 
 Instances of directors serving on multiple boards in general, or director “busyness”, has 
caused concerns from investors, corporate governance activists, and academics that these 
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directors may be stretching themselves too thin (ISS 2015a; ISS 2015b; Ferris et al. 2003; Fich 
and Shivdasani 2006). Further, these concerns have become particularly relevant to the audit 
committee, where the bulk of the increase in workload has occurred since the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (Audit Committee Leader Network [ACLN] 2011; Spencer Stuart 2015, 26). Recent research 
examines the effect of audit committee director busyness on audit committee effectiveness. 
Sharma and Iselin (2012) and Tanyi and Smith (2015) both find that audit committee busyness is 
associated with lower audit committee effectiveness. However, my study differs in that I am not 
examining busyness. Rather than examining the effect of serving on multiple audit committees 
(i.e., comparing directors on multiple audit committees to directors on one audit committee), I 
restrict my sample to directors serving on at least two audit committees and examine how they 
allocate their monitoring effort across the multiple audit committees they serve, and control for 
the total number of audit committee directorships. 
Audit Committee Effectiveness Literature Review 
 The audit committee is the primary governance mechanism put in place to monitor the 
accounting and financial reporting processes at public companies (Blue Ribbon Committee 
[BRC] 1999; Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX] 2002; Gendron and Bedard 2006; Beasley et al. 2009). 
There is a large body of research examining the role of the audit committee in monitoring the 
financial reporting process. Many of these studies focus on characteristics of the individuals 
serving on the audit committee. 
  Various studies have focused on the independence of the audit committee. Klein (2002) 
documents a negative association between audit committees being comprised of a majority of 
independent directors and abnormal accruals. Abbot et al. (2004) find that the presence of a fully 
independent audit committee is negatively associated with restatements. Carcello et al. (2011b) 
 10 
examine independence from a different aspect and find that audit committee independence, as 
defined in earlier studies, does not decrease the likelihood of restatements when the CEO of the 
firm is involved in director selection. Similarly, Bruynseels et al. (2014) and Cassell et al. (2017) 
examine independence differently than earlier studies. Bruynseels et al. (2014) document that 
firms at which the audit committee members have social ties to the CEO purchase fewer audit 
services and engage more in earnings management. Cassell et al. (2017) measure audit 
committee independence using the proportion of the committee that is co-opted (appointment of 
audit committee members after the current CEO) and find a positive relation between audit 
committee co-option and misstatements as well as between audit committee co-option and 
absolute discretionary accruals.6 
Numerous studies have also examined the effect of the expertise of members of the audit 
committee. A few of the studies mentioned previously that examine audit committee 
independence also examine audit committee financial expertise and find that audit committee 
financial expertise is positively associated with audit committee effectiveness (Abbot et al. 2004; 
Carcello et al. 2011b). Agrawal and Chadha (2005) document that the presence of an 
independent financial expert on the audit committee is negatively associated with restatements. 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) distinguish between different types of financial expertise and 
find that accounting financial expertise is positively associated with accounting conservatism, 
while the more general financial expertise defined by the SEC in SOX is not significantly 
                                                
6 Other studies examine the effect of audit committee independence on auditor contracting and auditor reporting 
outcomes rather than directly examining financial reporting quality. For example, Abbot et al. (2003) examines the 
effect of audit committee independence on audit fees. Also, Carcello and Neal (2000) examine how audit committee 
independence affects the probability the auditor will issue a going concern report for a financially distressed firm, 
and Carcello and Neal (2003) examine how audit committee independence affects the likelihood the auditor will be 
dismissed after a first time going concern report for the audit client.  
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associated with conservatism. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) find that audit committees with both non-
accounting financial expertise and accounting financial expertise are most effective at 
constraining accruals management as compared to audit committees with only one type of 
financial expertise. Lisic et al. (2016) find that audit committee financial expertise is negatively 
associated with instances of internal control weaknesses, but that this affect no longer exists 
when the CEO is extremely powerful. Similarly, Badolato et al. (2014) find that the positive 
effect of audit committee financial expertise on earnings quality is significantly weaker when 
audit committee members have lower relative status compared to management. Other types of 
audit committee expertise that have been found to improve audit committee effectiveness are 
industry specific expertise (Cohen et al. 2010), legal expertise (Krishnan et al. 2011), and 
auditing expertise, as measured by experience as an audit partner (Naiker and Sharma 2009).7 
Most relevant to my study is the recent research examining the effect of audit committee 
director busyness on audit committee effectiveness. Sharma and Iselin (2012) and Tanyi and 
Smith (2015) both document a negative association between audit committee busyness and audit 
committee effectiveness. As stated previously, my study differs in that I am not examining the 
effect of serving on multiple audit committees. My sample only contains directors that serve on 
at least two audit committees and I examine how they allocate their monitoring effort across the 
multiple audit committees that they serve. 
Development of Hypotheses 
Past work on director reputation documents that directors have a strong incentive to 
develop a reputation as an effective monitor so that they can obtain more board seats in the future 
(Yermack 2004). Directors face reputational penalties in the director labor market when severe 
                                                
7 Other studies that examine the effect of additional attributes of the audit committee on financial reporting quality 
include Xie et al. (2003), Krishnan (2005), Vafeas (2005), Archambeault et al. (2008), and Campbell et al. (2015). 
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monitoring failures occur (Gilson 1990; Harford 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2007), and this is 
particularly true when financial reporting failures occur (Srinivasan 2005; Brochet and Srinivasan 
2014). Thus, directors that hold multiple directorships must strategically allocate their monitoring 
effort across their directorships to maximize their reputation. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that 
larger firms provide greater visibility, prestige, and reputation value to the directors at those firms, 
thereby increasing the reputation incentive for directors to be effective monitors at those firms. If 
potential to build reputation and visibility is greater at larger firms, then directors on multiple 
boards should exert more monitoring effort at the relatively larger firms in their portfolio of board 
seats (Masulis and Mobbs 2014). 
 I argue that in the case of directors that serve on multiple audit committees, directors will 
allocate more of their monitoring effort to the audit committees at the relatively larger, more 
important firms in their portfolio because these firms offer the director higher reputation 
incentives. My hypothesis, stated in the alternative, is: 
H1: Directors that serve on multiple audit committees exert more monitoring effort on 
the audit committees at firms that offer relatively higher reputation incentives in their 
portfolio of audit committee seats, as evidenced by higher FRQ. 
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III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample Selection and Data 
I focus on audit committee chairs and designated financial experts because these 
individuals drive the financial reporting monitoring activities of the audit committee (DeFond et 
al. 2005; Beasley et al. 2009; Carcello et al. 2011a; National Association for Corporate Directors 
[NACD] 2014; Tanyi and Smith 2015). The audit committee chair sets the agenda in preparation 
for committee meetings, coordinates communication between the auditor and management, and 
keeps the remainder of the board informed on the audit committee’s work (KPMG 2015; Audit 
Committee Leadership Network [ACLN] 2017). The designated financial expert is also a key 
member on the audit committee. The importance of the financial expert is evidenced by the SOX 
mandate that companies disclose whether they have a designated financial expert on the audit 
committee and, if not, to explain why. Also, as discussed previously, there is a sizeable body of 
research that supports the notion that the presence of a financial expert on the audit committee is 
an important factor in determining audit committee effectiveness (Agrawal and Chadha 2005; 
Abbot et al. 2004; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; Dhaliwal et al. 2010; Carcello et al. 2011b). 
Audit committee chairs and financial experts are the directors held most accountable for 
monitoring FRQ, so their reputation will be most negatively affected if there is a financial 
reporting failure. Thus, I restrict my analysis to these directors because the reputation incentives 
for them are most salient.8 
                                                
8 To provide anecdotal context to the academic literature, I spoke with an experienced audit committee member of 
several public companies. The audit committee member revealed that the most accountable members of the audit 
committee are the chair and the designated financial expert. Audit committee chairs receive extra compensation for 
being the chair, which is indicative of a higher level of accountability. Furthermore, in serious financial reporting 
failures, the chair has been singled out and named individually in litigation (LaCroix 2014). 
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To form my sample, I identify all director-firm-years that represent an audit committee 
chair (AC CHAIR) or designated financial expert (FINEXP) covered by Compustat, Audit 
Analytics, and BoardEx for fiscal years 2004 through 2014 with all necessary data.9 I drop 
regulated firms (following Reichelt and Wang 2010) and create a director-firm-year level 
datatset of all observations where the director is either the designated financial expert or the audit 
committee chair for at least two firms in my sample. This results in 3,140 firm-years in the 
misstatement sample, 2,747 firm-years in the F-Score sample, 2,129 firm-years in the material 
weaknesses sample, and 2,779 firm-years in the accruals sample. My sample selection process is 
described further in Table 1.  
Methodology 
I follow prior research and proxy for low financial reporting quality using misstatements 
(Palmrose et al. 2004; Desai et al. 2006; Dechow et al. 2010; Cao et al. 2012), high F-Scores 
(Dechow et al. 2011; Wang et al. 2015; Bradley et al. 2017), higher levels of the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals (Myers et al. 2003; Dechow et al. 2010; Cao et al. 2012), and material 
weaknesses in internal control (Dechow et al. 2010; Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman 2011; 









                                                
9 In most cases, the designated financial expert is the same individual that serves as the audit committee chair. 
However, there are instances where the two roles are held by two different directors. If the two roles are held by 
different directors and both directors serve on multiple audit committees, then there will be repeated firm-year 
observations for that firm. This occurs for only a very small portion of my sample (95 duplicate firm-years). 
Dropping these observations does not change my results and inferences. 
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MISSTATEdit or  
HIGH_FSCOREdit = a0 + a1HIGH_REPdit + a2SIZEdit + a3MTBdit+ a4ROAdit      
+a5LOSSdit + a6LEVdit + a7AR_INVdit + a8BIG4dit  
+a9AUD_IMPORTdit + a10IND_SPECIALISTdit + a11BUS_SEGdit 
+ a12RESTRUCTUREdit + a13M&Adit + a14FOREIGNdit   
+a15BD_INDEPdit+a16BD_SIZEdit + a17AC_SIZEdit  
+ a18NUM_ACdit + a19DIR_TENUREdit + ajYEARFE + akINDFE  
+aLDIRFE + edit  (1)       
 
MWEAKdit  = b0 + b1HIGH_REPdit + b2SIZEdit + b3MTBdit + b4ROAdit +b5LOSSdit 
+ b6LEVdit + b7AR_INVdit + b8BIG4dit +a9AUD_IMPORTdit 
+b10IND_SPECIALISTdit + b11BUS_SEGdit  
 +b12RESTRUCTUREdit + b13M&Adit + b14FOREIGNdit 
 + b15BD_INDEPdit + b16BD_SIZEdit + b17AC_SIZEdit  
+b18NUM_ACdit + a19DIR_TENUREdit + b20AGEdit  
+b21SALES_GROWTHdit +bjYEARFE + bkINDFE  
+bLDIRFE + edit             (2) 
 
ABSDAdit  = c0 + c1HIGH_REPdit+ c2SIZEdit + c3MTBdit + c4ROAdit 
+c5LOSSdit+ c6LEVdit + c7AR_INVdit + c8BIG4dit 
+c9AUD_IMPORTdit + c10IND_SPECIALISTdit + c11BUS_SEGdit  
 + c12RESTRUCTUREdit+ c13M&Adit + c14FOREIGNdit    
+ c15BD_INDEPdit + c16BD_SIZEdit + c17AC_SIZEdit  
+c18NUM_ACdit + a19DIR_TENUREdit + c20VOL_CF_OPdit  
+c21LAG_ABSDAdit + cjYEARFE +ckINDFE +cLDIRFE+vdit           (3)     
 
where the dependent variable in Equation (1) is either MISSTATE (an indicator variable equal to 
one if any of the core accounts in the year t annual financial statements of firm i were misstated, 
as identified in a future restatement from Audit Analytics’ Non-Reliance database, and zero 
otherwise) or HIGH_FSCORE, (an indicator variable equal to one if the F-Score for firm i in 
year t, as calculated in Dechow et al. (2011), is higher than 1.85).10 The dependent variable in 
                                                
10To classify core and non-core misstatements, I follow Pittman and Zhao (2017) and classify a core accounting 
misstatement as one where the "res_acc_res_fkey_list" field in Audit Analytics includes any of the following: 1, 3, 
4, 6, 7, 12, 14, 20, 21 23, 29, or 42. Pittman and Zhao (2017) follow Palmrose and Scholz (2004) and Cassell, 
Dreher, and Myers (2013) in capturing core accounting issues as those related to revenue, cost of sales, operating 
expenses, etc.  The F-Score is the calculated probability of a firm misstating the financial statements so egregiously 
that the firm receives an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) from the SEC. It measures the 
likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. This measure allows me to observe firms that likely have serious 
financial reporting irregularities, regardless of whether or not the SEC identifies the firm and issues an AAER to the 
firm. To calculate the F-score, the predicted probability is derived as ePV / (1 + ePV) divided by the unconditional 
probability of an AAER (0.0037), where PV is the predicted value from model 1 in Dechow et al. (2011): Predicted 
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Equation (2) is MWEAK (an indicator variable equal to one if the auditor for firm i reported a 
material weakness in internal control in year t, identified using Audit Analytics’ SOX 404 
database, and zero otherwise). The dependent variable in Equation (3) is ABSDA (the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals for firm i in year t, estimated using the performance-adjusted 
modified Jones model (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995) following Kothari et al. (2005).11 The 
variable of interest is HIGH_REP, an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is the largest, or 
within 10% of the largest, directorship that the director d holds (as measured by market 
capitalization of the firm), and zero otherwise.12 HIGH_REP is a proxy for high reputation 
incentives relative to the other firms served by the same director d. Thus, to ensure that the 
coefficient on HIGH_REP is relative to the other firms served by the same director d, I include 
director fixed effects in my model. I estimate the MISSTATE, HIGH_FSCORE, and MWEAK 
models as linear probability models and estimate the ABSDA model using ordinary least squares 
                                                
Value = -7.893 + 0.790*rsst_acc + 2.518*ch_rec + 1.191*ch_inv + 1.979*soft_assets + 0.171*ch_cs - 0.932*ch_roa 
+ 1.029*issue. All terms are as defined in Dechow et al. (2011). Dechow et al. (2011) classify firms with an F-Score 
greater than 1.85 as a firm with “substantial risk” or “high risk” of receiving an AAER from the SEC. 
11 Using all firms in Compustat with available data, I estimate the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDA) 
cross-sectionally by year and two-digit SIC industry following Kothari et al. (2005). Thus, I estimate the 
performance-adjusted modified Jones model (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995) by including lagged return on assets, 
and retaining only those industry-years with a minimum of 10 observations. The model is as follows:  
TAit = γ1(1/Ait-1) + γ2((ΔSit - ΔARit)/Ait-1) + γ3(PPEit/Ait-1) + γ4(ROAit-1) + ζit. To maximize data retention, I calculate 
total accruals (TA) using the cash flow method (i.e., income before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows 
from continuing operations (Hribar and Collins 2002), and if the data necessary to calculate the cash flow method 
are missing, I set TA equal to total accruals following the balance sheet method in Kothari et al. (2005) (i.e., change 
in non-cash current assets minus the change in current liabilities excluding the current portion of long-term debt, 
minus depreciation and amortization, scaled by lagged total assets). This substitution method is based on Wilson 
(2009). A is equal to total assets; ΔS is equal to the change in total sales revenue from the prior year; ΔAR is equal to 
the change in accounts receivable from prior year; PPE is equal to property, plant, and equipment; and ROA is equal 
to net income divided by lagged total assets. ABSDA is equal to the absolute value of the residual (ζ).  
12 I use 10% because Masulis and Mobbs (2014) use this threshold. However, in later sensitivity tests, I examine 
whether my results are sensitive to using different thresholds. See Appendix B for a detailed example of how my 
measure is constructed. 
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regression, with robust standard errors clustered by firm.13 The variables are defined in detail in 
Appendix A. 
Control Variables  
For the MISSTATE model in Equation (1), I control for variables that have been found to 
affect the likelihood of a misstatement. Because larger firms are less likely to misstate financial 
statements, and my variable of interest is constructed based on relative size of the firm, I control 
for the absolute size (SIZE) of the firm. Because more complex firms are more likely to misstate 
financial statements, I also control for complexity (RESTRUCTURE, FOREIGN, M&A, 
BUS_SEG) of the firm (Cao et al. 2012; DeHaan et al. 2013). I control for the financial condition 
of the firm (LOSS, LEV, ROA) because financially weak firms are more likely to misstate 
financial statements (Cao et al. 2012; DeHaan et al. 2013). I control for expected growth (MTB) 
because it is positively associated with misstatements (Cao et al. 2012; DeHaan et al. 2013), and 
for the proportion of assets in receivables and inventory (AR_INV) because misstatements are 
more likely when this proportion is higher (Cao et al. 2012). I control for characteristics of the 
auditor (BIG4, AUD_IMPORT, IND_SCPECIALIST) because auditors are an important 
determinant of FRQ (Reynolds and Francis 2000; Reichelt and Wang 2010). I control for 
governance characteristics related to the likelihood of misstatements (AC_SIZE, BD_INDEP, 
BD_SIZE) (Cao et al. 2012). I also include the number of audit committees that the director 
serves on (NUM_AC) and director tenure (DIR_TENURE) in my model because both have been 
found to be related to FRQ (Sharma and Iselin 2012; Tanyi and Smith 2015). I include year fixed 
                                                
13 Even though MISSTATE, HIGH_FSCORE, and MWEAK are dichotomous variables, I use linear probability 
models, as opposed to a non-linear model, because the latter would drop observations where there is no variation in 
the dependent variable within one of my fixed effect categories (i.e., industry and year). Moreover, Wooldridge 
(2010) supports the use of linear probability models when estimating the average partial effects of explanatory 
variables on a binary outcome variable, which is my main objective in Equations (1) and (2).  
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effects to control for trends in misstatement rates over time (YEARFE) and industry fixed effects 
because firms in some industries could be more likely to misstate (INDFE). I use this same 
equation for the HIGH_FSCORE model, since it is a measure of the likelihood of fraudulent 
financial misreporting. The measure is similar in nature to my misstatement measure, but is 
different in that it captures the likelihood of financial statement irregularities so egregious that 
the firm receives an AAER from the SEC. 
 In Equation (2), I control for the variables from Equation (1) but add the following 
control variables that predict material weaknesses in Doyle et al. (2007): company age (AGE) 
and sales growth (SALES_GROWTH). 
I include the same set of control variables from Equation (1) in Equation (3) because 
discretionary accruals is another measure of FRQ so any relations could be similar. I also control 
for factors commonly included in discretionary accruals models. Specifically, I also control for 
volatility of cash flows from operations (VOL_CF_OP) and lagged discretionary accruals 




Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests 
 Panel A and Panel B of Table 2 report descriptive statistics for my sample. Panel A 
reports statistics at a director-firm-year level. My variable of interest, HIGH_REP, has a reported 
mean of 0.48, so about half of the companies in my sample offer the director relatively high 
reputation incentives compared to the other companies that the director serves. Panel B reports 
descriptive statistics at a director-year level. The mean of the number of audit committees that an 
individual director serves (NUM_AC) is 2.37. By construction of my sample, all directors serve 
on the audit committee of at least two different companies. The 75th percentile of NUM_AC is 
3.00, indicating that there is a considerable number of directors that serve on three audit 
committees. Each director has at least one high reputation incentive company 
(NUM_HIGH_REP) and at least one non-high reputation incentive company 
(NUM_NOT_HIGH_REP) at which they sit on the audit committee. The 75th percentile of 
NUM_HIGH_REP and NUM_NOT_HIGH_REP is 1.00 and 2.00, respectively. This indicates 
that most of the time, directors have only one firm that offers them high reputation incentives, 
and if the director happens to serve on more than two audit committees, then they usually have 
one high reputation incentive firm and multiple non-high reputation incentive firms. 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 3 report descriptive statistics on the financial reporting 
quality measures in my various samples for firms that are high reputation incentive firms 
(HIGH_REP = 1) and firms that are not high reputation incentive firms (HIGH_REP = 0). The 
first column in Panel A reports that the likelihood of a misstatement, MISSTATE, is not 
significantly different for high reputation incentive firms (6 percent) compared to firms that are 
not high reputation incentive firms (6 percent). The means of the two partitions for MISSTATE is 
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consistent with past research examining misstatements (Cao et al. 2012). The second column in 
Panel A reports that the probability that the F-Score is greater than 1.85, HIGH_FSCORE, is 
significantly lower for high reputation incentive firms (8 percent) compared to firms that are not 
high reputation incentive firms (9 percent). The means of HIGH_FSCORE for the two sample 
partitions are consistent with Dechow et al. (2011).14 The first column of Panel B shows that the 
likelihood of material weakness, MWEAK, is significantly lower for high reputation incentive 
firms (4 percent) compared to firms that are not high reputation incentive firms (6 percent). The 
means of the two partitions for MWEAK are consistent with past research examining material 
weaknesses (Garrett et al. 2014). The second column of Panel B reports the results for 
discretionary accruals, ABSDA, and shows that ABSDA is significantly lower for high reputation 
incentive firms (0.05) compared to firms that are not high reputation incentive firms (0.06). The 
means are generally consistent with Kothari et al. (2005). In summary, H1 is supported, on a 
univariate basis, using three of my four measures of audit committee effectiveness in monitoring 
FRQ. 
Each column in Panel A and Panel B of Table 3 shows univariate tests for the control 
variables. Univariate tests consistently show that high reputation incentive firms (HIGH_REP = 
1) are quite different from firms that that are not considered high reputation incentive firms 
(HIGH_REP = 0). As expected, size is significantly different between the two groups. High 
reputation incentive firms are significantly larger than low reputation incentive firms, which 
illustrates the importance of controlling for absolute size in my multivariate analysis in the next 
section. Additionally, high reputation incentive firms are more complex, have better 
                                                
14 Dechow et al. (2011, 63) details that 10 percent of the 132,967 non-AAER firms in their sample and 32.6 percent 
of the 494 AAER firms in their sample have a F-Score greater than 1.85. This translates into a 10 percent 
{[(.10*132,967) +(.326*494)] /(132,967+494)} rate of the population of firms in general having a F-Score greater 
than 1.85. 
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performance, have better governance, and are more likely to have large and specialized auditors. 
The differences in the characteristics between the two groups further highlight the importance of 
controlling for each characteristic in my multivariate analyses. 
The Effect of Reputation Incentives on Audit Committee Effectiveness (H1)  
 I report the results from estimating Equation (1) in Panel A of Table 4. Column 1 reports 
the multivariate regression results for the association between high reputation incentives for the 
director and misstatements. HIGH_REP is not statistically significant (p > 0.10), suggesting that 
directors on multiple audit committees do not provide differential levels of monitoring to each of 
their directorships, which is inconsistent with H1. Column 2 in Panel A of Table 4 reports the 
multivariate regression results for the association between high reputation incentives for the 
director and the probability of having a F-Score greater than 1.85. HIGH_REP is negative and 
significant (p < 0.10), suggesting that directors on multiple audit committees provide more 
monitoring effort over financial reporting on the audit committees at firms offering them higher 
reputation incentives, which is consistent with H1.  
I report the results from estimating Equation (2) in Panel B of Table 4. Panel B of Table 4 
reports the multivariate regression results for the association between high reputation incentives 
for the director and the likelihood of a material weaknesses in internal control over financial 
reporting. HIGH_REP is negative and significant (p < 0.10), suggesting that directors on 
multiple audit committees provide more monitoring effort over financial reporting on the audit 
committees offering them higher reputation incentives, which is consistent with H1.  
I report the results from estimating Equation (3) in Panel C of Table 4. Panel C of Table 4 
reports the multivariate regression results for the association between high reputation incentives 
for the director and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. HIGH_REP is negative and 
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significant (p < 0.10), suggesting that AC Chairs on multiple audit committees provide more 
monitoring effort over financial reporting on the audit committees at firms offering them higher 
reputation incentives, which is consistent with H1.  
Based on these results, H1 is supported using three of my four measures of audit 
committee effectiveness, even after controlling for a host of firm characteristics, year fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects, and director fixed effects.  
Additional Analysis 
 
Busyness Level Analysis 
 
 While my sample only contains directors that serve on multiple audit committees, there is 
still variation in the number of audit committees that the directors serve. Table 5 shows that 452 
director-years out of the 1,493 unique director-years in my sample are associated with directors 
serving on three or more audit committees. So, roughly one third of the directors in my sample 
serve on three or more audit committees, meaning that those directors have a higher level of 
busyness than directors that only serve on two audit committees. The level of busyness that an 
individual director has may affect the extent to which that director needs to strategically allocate 
monitoring effort across audit committees. The effect of HIGH_REP may be driven by directors 
serving on more audit committees (three or more) as opposed to less audit committees (only 
two). To examine whether this is the case, I perform cross-sectional analysis to investigate 
whether the effect of reputation incentives differs between directors that serve two audit 
committees and directors that serve three or more audit committees. 
  Table 6 presents the results of this additional test. I create an indicator variable 
(THREE_OR_MORE) that is equal to one if the director serves on 3 or more audit committees, 
and zero otherwise. I re-estimate the analyses from Table 4, and I interact HIGH_REP with 
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THREE_OR_MORE. A negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term would mean 
that the effect of HIGH_REP is stronger when the director serves on three or more audit 
committees as compared to when the director serves on two audit committees.  Panels A-C of 
Table 6 show that the coefficient on HIGH_REP*THREE_OR_MORE is statistically 
insignificant in all models. This indicates that there is no statistically significant difference 
between the effect of HIGH_REP when the director serves on two audit committees and the 
effect of HIGH_REP when the director serves on three or more audit committees. Thus, the 
effect does not appear to be driven by the directors serving on three or more audit committees. 
Early Tenure Analysis 
While I control for the tenure of directors at the firms they serve (DIR_TENURE), the 
effect of HIGH_REP may differ depending on the director’s tenure. Past work has documented a 
negative relation between audit committee director effectiveness and audit committee director 
tenure (Sharma and Iselin 2012). The effect of HIGH_REP may be strongest when the director is 
still in the early stages of tenure at a firm because the director may be more independent of 
management and the director still has yet to develop a reputation at that firm for being an 
effective monitor. To examine whether this is the case, I perform cross-sectional analysis to 
investigate whether the effect of reputation incentives differs between directors in the early 
stages of tenure and directors in later years of tenure at their respective firms. 
I create an indicator variable (EARLY_TENURE) that is equal to one if the director is in 
year one or year two of their tenure at a given firm, and zero otherwise. Table 7 presents the 
reported means for EARLY_TENURE in each of my samples.  I re-estimate the analyses from 
Table 4, and I interact HIGH_REP with EARLY_TENURE. A negative and significant coefficient 
on the interaction term would mean that the effect is stronger when the director is in the early 
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stages of tenure at a firm.  Panels A-C of Table 8 show that the coefficient on 
HIGH_REP*EARLY_TENURE is statistically insignificant in all models. This indicates that 
there is no statistically significant difference between the effect of HIGH_REP when the director 
is in the early stages of tenure and the effect of HIGH_REP when the director is not in the early 
stages of tenure. Thus, the effect does not appear to be driven by directors in the early stages of 
their tenure at the firm. 
Threshold in Measurement of High Reputation Incentives  
 I follow Masulis and Mobbs (2014) and use a 10% threshold for difference in firm size to 
determine whether reputation incentives are high or not. It could be argued, however, that 10% is 
an arbitrary threshold to use. As a robustness check, I re-estimate Equations (1) through (3) and I 
use different thresholds for my measurement of HIGH_REP to examine whether my results are 
sensitive to the threshold used. I use both 20% and 50% thresholds to measure HIGH_REP in 
this analysis. For each threshold, I continue to require that each director has at least one high 
reputation incentive observation and at least one not-high reputation incentive observation in 
each year. This results in my sample size dropping as the threshold increases. Panel A of Table 9 
shows that the coefficient on HIGH_REP remains insignificant (p>0.10) for the misstatement 
model when I use 20% as a threshold to measure HIGH_REP in Column 1 and when I use 50% 
as a threshold to measure HIGH_REP in Column 2. Thus, I do not find evidence that directors 
allocate effort to the point that their less important directorships are more likely to misstate.  
Panel B of Table 9 shows that the coefficient on HIGH_REP remains negative and significant 
(p<0.10) for the F-Score model when I use 20% and 50% thresholds to measure HIGH_REP in 
Columns 1 and 2, respectively. Panel C of Table 9 shows that the coefficient on HIGH_REP 
remains negative and significant (p<0.10) for the material weakness model when I use 20% and 
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50% thresholds to measure HIGH_REP in Columns 1 and 2, respectively. Panel D of Table 9 
shows that the coefficient on HIGH_REP remains negative and significant (p<0.10) for the 
accruals model when I use 20% and 50% thresholds to measure HIGH_REP in Columns 1 and 2, 
respectively. Thus, my inferences are not sensitive to the threshold used to measure HIGH_REP. 
Big R Analysis 
  I re-estimate Equation (1) using another measure of misstatements as my dependent 
variable, BIG_R. Following Tan and Young (2015), I define BIG_R as an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm misstated financial statements in year t and the subsequent restatement 
was disclosed in an 8-K under item 4.02. “Big R” misstatements are more material in nature and 
magnitude and are clearer signals of poor financial reporting than the other “little r” 
misstatements that Audit Analytics captures (Tan and Young 2015). BIG_R is an appropriate 
measure worth examining because investors and boards should care more about these types of 
misstatements. 
 Table 10 presents the multivariate analysis using BIG_R as the dependent variable. 
Columns 1, 2, and 3 use a 10%, 20%, and 50% relative size threshold to measure HIGH_REP, 
respectively. The coefficient on HIGH_REP in Columns 1 – 3 are all statistically insignificant 
(p>0.10). I, again, do not find evidence that directors unevenly allocate effort across their audit 
committees to the point that their less important firms are more likely to misstate, even when 
focusing on more material and problematic misstatements. 
F-Score Continuous Measure Analysis 
While Dechow et al. (2011) define firms with an F-Score greater than 1.85 as having 
“substantial risk” of receiving an AAER from the SEC, the F-Score itself is a continuous 
measure of the probability of receiving an AAER from the SEC because of financial reporting 
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irregularities. I re-estimate Equation (1) using the continuous measure of the F-Score (FSCORE), 
rather than the indicator variable from my previous analyses (HIGH_FSCORE), to investigate 
whether my results are robust to the continuous measure of the F-Score. 
Table 11 presents the multivariate analysis using FSCORE as the dependent variable. 
Columns 1, 2, and 3 use a 10%, 20%, and 50% relative size threshold to measure HIGH_REP, 
respectively. The coefficient on HIGH_REP in Columns 1-3 are all negative and significant 
(p<0.10), consistent with my analysis using the indicator variable. My results are robust to the 
continuous measure of the F-Score. 
Firm Fixed Effects 
In Table 12, I re-estimate Equations (1)–(3), but I use firm fixed effects rather than industry 
fixed effects. On the one hand, using firm fixed effects controls for potentially omitted time-
invariant characteristics of each firm that may determine FRQ. Firm fixed effects allows for a 
stronger inference that my variable of interest is a determinant of FRQ, and is not just associated 
with some unobserved inherent firm characteristic that is a determinant of FRQ. On the other hand, 
firm fixed effects can also fail to detect a relation that exists between the explanatory variable of 
interest and the dependent variable when the explanatory variable does not vary much within firms, 
as is the case in my sample (Adams and Ferreira 2008). 
In each Panel of Table 12, Columns 1, 2, and 3 use a 10%, 20%, and 50% relative size 
threshold to measure HIGH_REP, respectively. Panel A presents the misstatement analysis. The 
results are consistent with the analysis using industry fixed effects. The coefficient on HIGH_REP 
in Columns 1, 2, and 3 are all statistically insignificant. Panel B presents the F-Score analysis. The 
results are generally consistent with my analysis using industry fixed effects. While the coefficient 
on HIGH_REP in Column 2 is statistically insignificant (p>0.10), it is approaching significance 
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and the coefficient is negative. Further, the coefficient on HIGH_REP in Columns 1 and 3 are both 
negative and significant (p<0.10). Panel C presents my material weakness analysis. The results are 
inconsistent with my analysis using industry fixed effects. The coefficient on HIGH_REP in 
Columns 1, 2, and 3 are all statistically insignificant (p>0.10), while they were all negative and 
significant using industry fixed effects. Panel D presents the accruals analysis. The results are 
consistent with the analysis using industry fixed effects. The coefficient on HIGH_REP in 
Columns 1, 2, and 3 are all negative and significant (p<0.10). Three of my four measures give me 
consistent results whether I use firm fixed effects or industry fixed effects. The only measure that 
gives me inconsistent results is material weaknesses, and this is likely because of how rarely 
material weaknesses occur. MWEAK is the dependent variable with the least amount of variation. 
The fact that I find statistically significant and consistent results on two of my measures using firm 
fixed effects provides reasonable evidence that the results from my previous analysis are not 
simply correlated with unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics that determine FRQ. 
Continuous Measure of Reputation Incentives 
 
  In my main tests, I use an indicator variable based on relative firm size to measure 
reputation incentives. I classify firms as either offering a director high reputation incentives or 
not offering the director high reputation incentives. While this measure clearly distinguishes 
between the two groups of firms, there is still variation within groups that my measure does not 
capture. I perform additional analysis to examine whether my results are consistent using a 
continuous measure of reputation incentives. I create a variable, DIST_FROM_MEDIAN, that is 
calculated as the difference between the SIZE variable of firm i and the median of the SIZE 
variable of all the firms that director d serves in year t. While HIGH_REP measures whether a 
firm is significantly larger than the other firms that a director serves, DIST_FROM_MEDIAN 
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measures the magnitude of how much larger or smaller a firm is than the other firms that a 
director serves. DIST_FROM_MEDIAN preserves the variation in the measure of reputation 
incentives. 
 I re-estimate Equations (1)–(3) using DIST_FROM_MEDIAN as the independent variable 
in Table 13. Consistent with my main analysis using HIGH_REP, the coefficient on 
DIST_FROM_MEDIAN is negative and significant in Columns 2-4. The coefficient on 
DIST_FROM_MEDIAN is statistically insignificant in the misstatement model, which is also 
consistent with my main analysis. Thus, my results are robust to a continuous measure of 
director reputation incentives. 
Size Distribution Analysis 
 
  I follow past studies and control for absolute firm size in each of my analyses because 
firm size is a key determinant of FRQ (Cao et al. 2012; DeHaan et al. 2013; Doyle et al. 2007). 
However, the effect of director reputation incentives that I document in my analyses may differ 
depending on the firm’s absolute size. On one hand, the largest firms have inherently higher 
FRQ because of significantly more robust systems of controls, more expert personnel, and 
stronger governance. Thus, the effect of HIGH_REP on FRQ may not be as strong for the largest 
firms because those firms may have good FRQ regardless of the relative level of reputation 
incentives the firm offers to key audit committee directors. One may expect the result of 
HIGH_REP to be strongest for smaller firms that likely rely more on the input and effort of key 
audit committee directors. On the other hand, the effect of HIGH_REP could be driven by larger 
firms. To the extent that my absolute size variable (SIZE) does not adequately control for the 
effect of absolute firm size, HIGH_REP could simply be capturing an absolute size effect. The 
larger the firm, the more likely the firm is going to be classified as a high reputation incentive 
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firm for the director. Panel A of Table 14 illustrates this point and shows that the reported mean 
of HIGH_REP differs in the two distributions of firm size. The reported mean for HIGH_REP in 
the top half of the distribution (0.66) is much higher than the reported mean in the bottom half of 
the distribution of firm size (0.30).  This highlights the importance of my cross-sectional analysis 
to investigate whether the effect of HIGH_REP differs between smaller firms and larger firms. 
To perform my analysis, I split my sample at the median of firm size and create a 
subsample of larger firms with size above the median and a subsample of smaller firms with size 
below or equal to the median. I re-estimate the main analyses from Table 4 on the two 
subsamples. For each sample’s analysis, I again require each director to have at least one high 
reputation incentive firm and at least one non-high reputation incentive firm. This requirement 
reduces my sample size, but is critical to the interpretation of my coefficient of interest. Panel A 
of Table 15 presents my analysis on firms in the top half of the distribution of firm size. The 
coefficient on HIGH_REP is statistically insignificant in all columns. Panel B of Table 15 
presents my analysis on firms in the bottom half of the distribution of firm size. The coefficient 
on HIGH_REP is negative and significant in three of my four models, including the 
misstatement model. The fact that HIGH_REP is now negative and significant in the 
misstatement analyses suggests that the effect of reputation incentives is particularly strong for 
the smallest firms. Thus, the effect appears to be driven by smaller firms, and not larger firms. 
These results alleviate the concern that HIGH_REP is capturing an absolute firm size effect. 
Additionally, the results suggest that the reputation incentives of directors only matter for FRQ at 
smaller firms that likely depend more on director effort and monitoring. 
 I also estimate Equations (1)–(3) separately on each tercile. I perform tercile analysis for 
the sake of having a “mid-sized” firm classification. Panel B of Table 14 presents the reported 
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means for HIGH_REP in the top, middle, and bottom terciles of the distribution of firm size. For 
each tercile’s analysis, I again require each director to have at least one high reputation incentive 
firm and at least one non-high reputation incentive firm. Panel A of Table 16 presents the results 
for the regressions using the top tercile of firms. The coefficient on HIGH_REP is statistically 
insignificant in all models, suggesting that director reputation incentives appear to not matter for 
FRQ at the very largest firms. Panel B of Table 16 presents the results for the regressions using 
the middle tercile of firms. The coefficient on HIGH_REP is statistically insignificant in all 
models, suggesting that director reputation incentives do not matter for FRQ at mid-sized firms 
either. Panel C of Table 16 presents the results for the regressions using the bottom tercile of 
firms. The coefficient on HIGH_REP is negative and significant in three of my four models, 
including the misstatement model. The fact that HIGH_REP is negative and significant in the 
misstatement analyses in Panel B of Table 15 and in Panel C of Table 16 suggests that the effect 
of reputation incentives is particularly strong for smaller firms. The only dependent variable that 
does not have a negative and significant coefficient for the smallest firms in Table 15 and Table 
16 is HIGH_FSCORE. This may be because the F-Score is a measure of the likelihood of fraud. 
While my other measures can capture both errors and fraud committed by management in 
generating the financial statements, the F-Score is meant to solely capture egregious 
manipulation and misconduct. The uniqueness of the F-Score measure compared to my other 
measures may be the reason that the effect of HIGH_REP does not differ with firm size. Still, 
taken together, my results provide evidence that director reputation incentives matter more for 




The Addition of Audit Committee Seats by Directors 
 A stream of recent literature has documented the negative effects of a director holding 
multiple directorships (Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Sharma and Iselin 2012; Tanyi and Smith 
2015). Given that multiple directorships are associated with negative firm outcomes, directors 
are risking their reputations by accepting additional directorships. In the case of audit committee 
directors, poor financial reporting can result in directors losing their directorships and failing to 
gain directorships in the future because of damaged reputation (Srinivasan 2005). Audit 
committee directors are also more likely to be named in lawsuits after negative corporate 
outcomes (Brochet and Srinivasan 2014). So, the question of why audit committee directors are 
willing to accept additional audit committee seats is a compelling one. In this paper, I predict that 
directors on multiple audit committees should strategically allocate more of their monitoring 
effort to their audit committees at larger firms to maximize their reputation. Consistent with the 
reasoning behind this prediction, I also predict that directors are more willing to add another 
audit committee to their responsibilities when the audit committee is at a firm that is significantly 
larger than any firm they have served previously as an audit committee member. Such an 
addition to their responsibilities would contribute more to their reputation than the addition of an 
audit committee seat at smaller firm.15 
 Table 17 presents descriptive statistics on the addition of new audit committee seats by 
directors. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for all director-years associated with a FINEXP or 
an AC CHAIR. Five percent of all director-years are years in which a director added a new audit 
                                                
15 To provide some anecdotal support for the reasoning behind this assumption, I spoke with an experienced audit 
committee chair with experience serving on multiple audit committees. The audit committee member indicated that 
audit committee directors tend to add audit committee seats at larger, more reputable companies as their number of 
audit committees increases and their career as a director progresses. The director indicated that this likely occurs 
because directors consider the reputational risk of joining a board and whether the potential benefit to their 
reputation outweighs that risk.	
 32 
committee seat to their responsibilities (ADD1). Most of those additions are instances where the 
director is adding an audit committee seat at a firm that is either similar in size or significantly 
larger than any firm they have served previously (ADD_SIMILAR_OR_LARGER). Additionally, 
most of the additions are instances where the director is adding their second audit committee seat 
(BECOME_2) as opposed to adding a third or fourth seat (BECOME_3ORMORE). I separate the 
descriptive statistics by the number of audit committee seats that the director ends up with in 
Panel B and Panel C. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for additions where directors are 
adding their second audit committee and Panel C presents descriptive statistics for additions 
where directors end up with three or more audit committee seats (adding third, fourth, etc.). 
Panel B reports that, for directors adding their second audit committee, there is significant 
variation in whether the directors add an audit committee seat at a firm that is a similar size or 
significantly larger than the firm they currently serve (ADD_SIMILAR_OR_LARGER). Only 45 
percent of additions that represent the addition of a second audit committee seat are instances in 
which the director is adding an audit committee seat at a firm that is a similar size or 
significantly larger than the firm they currently serve. Panel C, however, reports that, for 
directors ending up with three or more audit committee seats (adding third, fourth, etc.), almost 
all the directors add an audit committee seat at a firm that is a similar size or significantly larger 
than any firm they currently serve (ADD_SIMILAR_OR_LARGER). Only eight percent of 
additions in Panel C are instances in which the director is adding an audit committee seat at a 
firm that is significantly smaller than any firm the director currently serves (ADD_SMALLER). 
The stark differences in the descriptive statistics for additions in Panel B and Panel C suggests 
that directors are generally only willing to add an audit committee seat at a smaller firm than 
their current firm if it will be their second audit committee seat. Going from serving one audit 
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committee to serving two is something that directors may view as enhancing their reputation in 
and of itself, regardless of the size of the new firm. When adding a third or fourth audit 
committee seat, however, directors appear to discriminate based on firm size (i.e. they are only 





  Reputation incentives theory suggests that reputation provides strong incentives for 
independent directors to be effective monitors. As it relates to the audit committee, key directors 
such as the audit committee chair and the designated financial experts should have very strong 
reputation incentives to effectively monitor the financial reporting process. Given the increased 
interest in audit committee members serving on multiple audit committees, it is important to 
understand how key members of the audit committee that serve on multiple audit committees 
prioritize their competing responsibilities.  
 In this study, I examine whether key audit committee members that serve on multiple 
audit committees allocate their monitoring effort unequally across their various audit 
committees. I find that even after controlling for absolute firm size and a host of other firm 
characteristics, firms that offer these directors a greater opportunity to enhance their reputation as 
a monitor (higher reputation incentives) have significantly higher FRQ, indicating higher audit 
committee effectiveness. I also find that my results are driven by smaller companies that likely 
rely more on the input and effort of key audit committee directors. My results are robust to 
various measures of high reputation incentives.  
In summary, I provide empirical evidence of the association between the reputation 
incentives of key audit committee members and audit committee effectiveness. My findings 
suggest that audit committee chairs and designated financial experts that serve on multiple audit 
committees tend to be more effective monitors on audit committees at companies that offer them 
the most potential to build a reputation as an effective monitor. The findings contribute to the 
audit committee effectiveness literature by documenting another attribute of the audit committee 
that impacts audit committee effectiveness. The findings also contribute to the literature on 
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director reputation incentives by showing that director reputation incentives not only affect firm 
performance, but affect FRQ as well. Further, I indirectly contribute to the director busyness 
literature by offering a more intricate view into director effort allocation. While past busyness 
studies focus on the number of directorships that a director holds, I show that directors that hold 
multiple directorships strategically distribute their monitoring effort based on the company’s 
relative contribution to their reputation. 
My findings should be of interest to boards, investors, and regulators considering the 
implications of key audit committee members that serve on multiple audit committees. In 
particular, boards at smaller public companies should consider the other firms that any 
potentially new audit committee directors serve on before they appoint them. While appointing 
an audit committee director from another larger, more visible firm may seem appealing, it may 
not result in a more effective audit committee for such firms. Along the same lines, smaller 
public companies might benefit from setting clear restrictions on both the number and the scale 
of outside commitments they will allow existing directors to have while they serve on the board. 
The relative size of the company compared to the other companies that a director serves can act 
as a signal to investors and boards about the potential quality of financial reporting monitoring 
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Variable   Source   Definition 
Dependent Variables:     
ABSDA   Compustat 
  
The absolute value of performance 
adjusted discretionary accruals 
calculated using the modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al. 1995) as 
adapted by Kothari et al. (2005) 
HIGH_FSCORE   Compustat 
  
Indicator variable equal to one if 
the firm's F-Score, as calculated in 
model 1 in Dechow et al. (2011), is 
greater than 1.85, and zero 
otherwise 
MISSTATE   Audit Analytics 
  
Indicator variable equal to one if 
core accounting issues 
("res_acc_res_fkey_list" includes 1, 
3, 4, 6, 7, 12, 14, 20, 21 23, 29, or 
42) in annual financial statements 
were misstated during year t, as 
evidenced by a subsequent 
restatement in the Non-Reliance 
database, and zero otherwise 
MWEAK   Audit Analytics 
  
Indicator variable equal to one if  
the auditor issued a material 
weakness opinion in year t, and 
zero otherwise 
     
 Variable of Interest:     
HIGH_REP   BoardEx 
  
Indicator variable equal to one if 
the directorship is the largest 
directorship, or within 10% of the 
largest, that the director holds (as 
measured by market capitalization 
of the firm), and zero otherwise 
     
Control Variables      
AC_SIZE   BoardEx   






The natural log of years the firm 






Receivables and inventory, divided 





Total fees paid by firm i to the 
auditor in year t divided by the total 
revenue of the auditor local office 





Indicator variable equal to one if 






Proportion of the board that is 
independent, measured as the 
number of independent directors 
divided by board size 
BD_SIZE   BoardEx   
Board size, measured by number of 
board members 
BUS_SEG   Compustat   
Square root of the number of 
business segments 





Indicator variable equal to one if 
the director d is in year 1 or 2 of 
their tenure at the directorship in 





Indicator variable equal to one if 
firm has foreign operations (FCA 
not equal to zero and not missing), 





Indicator variable equal to one if 
the auditor has the largest market 
share of a two-digit SIC category in 
the local MSA and if its market 
share is at least 10% greater than 
the second largest industry leader in 
the local MSA's audit market, and 






Lagged discretionary accruals, 
measured as ABSDA in year t-1 
LEV   Compustat   






Indicator variable equal to one if 
the firm reports a net loss (NI less 






Indicator variable equal to one if 
firm is involved in mergers or 
acquisitions (i.e., if any of the 
following are non-zero: AQA, 
AQC, AQD, AQEPS), and zero 
otherwise 
MTB   Compustat   
Market-to-
book[(PRCC_F*CSHO)/CEQ] 
NUM_AC   BoardEx   
The number of audit committees 
that director d serves on in year t 
ROA   Compustat   






Restructuring charges in year t 






Year-over-year sales growth 
[(SALE in year t - SALE in year t-
1) / SALE in year t-1] 
SIZE   Compustat   






Indicator variable equal to one if 
director d holds more than two 






Volatility of cash flows. Measured 
as standard deviation of variable 




Measurement of Relative Reputation Incentives (HIGH_REP) 
 
 
Firm Director Market Cap Difference HIGH_REP 
Y John Doe $500 M - 1 
Z John Doe $300 M 40% 0 
     
Firm Director Market Cap Difference HIGH_REP 
A Jane Smith $500 M - 1 
B Jane Smith $475 M 5% 1 
C Jane Smith $200 M 60% 0 
     
Notes: This appendix serves as an example of how my variable of interest, HIGH_REP, is 
measured. In the first example, John Doe's audit committee seats are ranked by the market 
capitalization of the firms at which he serves as audit committee chair or designated financial 
expert. His audit committee seat at his largest firm is automatically a high reputation incentive 
directorship. His second audit committee seat is over 10% smaller than the largest (it is 40% 
smaller), so it is not a high reputation incentive directorship. In the second example, Jane Smith's 
audit committee seats are also ranked by the market capitalization of the firms at which she 
serves as audit committee chair or designated financial expert. Her audit committee seat at her 
largest firm is automatically a high reputation incentive directorship. Her second audit committee 
seat is only 5% smaller than her largest audit committee seat (within 10%), so it is also a high 
reputation incentive directorship. Her third audit committee seat is 60% smaller than her largest 










Misstatement Sample   Observations 
Firms covered by AA, BoardEx, and Compustat      
    with AC CHAIR or FINEXP that serves on    
    multiple audit committees  8,991 
Drop regulated firms  (1,161) 
Drop directors that no longer    
    have multiple audit committees in the sample  (820) 
Less: firms missing data to estimate Equation (1)  (3,870) 
Final Sample in Misstatements Analysis  3,140 
		 		 		
	   
   
F-Score Sample 		 Observations 
Firms covered by AA, BoardEx, and Compustat      
    with AC CHAIR or FINEXP that serves on    
    multiple audit committees  8,991 
Drop regulated firms  (1,161) 
Drop directors that no longer    
    have multiple audit committees in the sample  (820) 
Less: firms missing data to calculate F-Score  (1,046) 
Less: firms missing data to estimate Equation (4)  (3,217) 















Table 1 Continued 
Sample Selection 
 
Material Weakness Sample 		 Observations 
Firms covered by AA, BoardEx, and Compustat      
    with AC CHAIR or FINEXP that serves on    
    multiple audit committees  8,991 
Drop regulated firms  (1,161) 
Drop directors that no longer    
    have multiple audit committees in the sample  (820) 
Less: firms not covered by AA SOX 404(B) database  (2,390) 
Less: firms missing data to estimate Equation (2)  (2,491) 
Final Sample in Material Weakness Analysis  2,129 
		 		 		
	   
   
Accruals Sample   Observations 
Firms covered by AA, BoardEx, and Compustat      
    with AC CHAIR or FINEXP that serves on    
    multiple audit committees  8,991 
Drop regulated firms  (1,161) 
Drop directors that no longer    
    have multiple audit committees in the sample  (820) 
Less: firms missing data to calculate accruals  (876) 
Less: firms missing data to estimate Equation (3)  (3,355) 
Final Sample in Accruals Analysis  2,779 







Panel A   		 		 		 		 		
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
MISSTATE 3,140 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 
F_SCORE 2,747 1.15 0.91 5.21 0.57 1.36 
HIGH_FSCORE 2,747 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 
MWEAK 2,129 0.05 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 
ABSDA 2,779 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.07 
HIGH_REP 3,140 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
SIZE 3,140 6.56 6.57 1.87 5.31 7.82 
MTB 3,140 3.72 2.22 7.95 1.45 3.76 
ROA 3,140 -0.01 0.04 0.23 -0.01 0.08 
LOSS 3,140 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
LEV 3,140 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.01 0.32 
AR_INV 3,140 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.11 0.36 
BIG4 3,140 0.84 1.00 0.36 1.00 1.00 
AUD_IMPORT 3,140 0.09 0.03 0.15 0.01 0.09 
IND_SPECIALIST 3,140 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 
BUSSEG_SR 3,140 2.15 1.73 1.05 1.73 3.00 
RESTRUCTURE 3,140 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
M&A 3,140 0.04 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 
FOREIGN 3,140 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
BDINDEP 3,140 0.76 0.80 0.13 0.67 0.88 
BDSIZE  3,140 8.29 8.00 2.11 7.00 10.00 
ACSIZE 3,140 3.57 3.00 0.86 3.00 4.00 
NUM_AC 3,140 2.42 2.00 0.66 2.00 3.00 
DIR_TENURE 3,140 6.73 5.20 5.91 2.40 9.30 
CO_AGE 2,129 23.80 17.00 17.24 10.00 36.00 
SALES_GROWTH 2,129 0.18 0.08 1.42 0.00 0.20 
VOL_CF_OP 2,779 0.07 0.03 0.44 0.02 0.06 
LAG_ABSDA 2,779 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.07 









Table 2 Continued 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B 		 		 		 		 		
Director-Year Level 
Descriptives 		 		 		 		 		
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
NUM_AC 2.37 2.00 0.62 2.00 3.00 
NUM_HIGH_REP 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
PROP_HIGH_REP 0.44 0.50 0.09 0.33 0.50 
NUM_NOT_HIGH_REP 1.37 1.00 0.62 1.00 2.00 
PROP_NOT_HIGH_REP 0.56 0.50 0.09 0.50 0.67 
      
Director-Year Observations 1,494 		 		 		 		


















Table 3  
Univariate Tests 
 Panel A MISSTATE SAMPLE   F_SCORE SAMPLE 
  HIGH_REP = 0 HIGH_REP = 1 p-val   HIGH_REP = 0 HIGH_REP = 1 p-val 
MISSTATE 0.06 0.06 (0.708)     
HIGH_FSCORE    0.09 0.08 (0.068)* 
SIZE 5.77 7.41 (0.000)***  5.82 7.46 (0.000)*** 
MTB 3.44 4.03 (0.020)**  3.32 3.93 (0.025)** 
ROA -0.04 0.02 (0.000)***  -0.03 0.04 (0.000)*** 
LOSS 0.37 0.19 (0.000)***  0.35 0.17 (0.000)*** 
LEV 0.18 0.21 (0.000)***  0.17 0.22 (0.000)*** 
AR_INV 0.27 0.24 (0.000)***  0.29 0.25 (0.000)*** 
BIG4 0.79 0.90 (0.000)***  0.81 0.91 (0.000)*** 
AUD_IMPORT 0.08 0.10 (0.000)***  0.08 0.11 (0.000)*** 
IND_SPECIAL 0.23 0.26 (0.023)**  0.24 0.27 (0.048)** 
BUSSEG_SR 2.04 2.18 (0.000)***  2.09 2.24 (0.000)*** 
RESTRUCTURE 0.31 0.33 (0.133)  0.33 0.35 (0.335) 
M&A 0.04 0.05 (0.174)  0.05 0.05 (0.167) 
FOREIGN 0.29 0.32 (0.081)*  0.3 0.32 (0.068)* 
BDINDEP 0.75 0.77 (0.000)***  0.76 0.78 (0.000)*** 
BDSIZE  7.92 8.70 (0.000)***  8.01 8.80 (0.000)*** 
ACSIZE 3.50 3.64 (0.000)***  3.53 3.66 (0.000)*** 
NUM_AC 2.46 2.37 (0.000)***  2.46 2.38 (0.000)*** 
DIR_TENURE 6.69 6.77 (0.642)  7.03 7.04 (0.522) 
        
Observations 1,636 1,504     1,429 1,322   
Notes: This table presents a test of differences in means between higher reputation incentive firms (HIGH_REP = 1) and firms that are not high reputation 
incentive firms (HIGH_REP = 0) in a director's portfolio of audit committee seats.  All variables are defined as in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided).  
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Table 3 Continued 
Univariate Tests 
 Panel B MWEAK SAMPLE   ABSDA SAMPLE 
  HIGH_REP = 0 HIGH_REP = 1 p-val   HIGH_REP = 0 HIGH_REP = 1 p-val 
MWEAK 0.06 0.04 (0.015)**     
ABSDA     0.06 0.05 (0.010)** 
SIZE 6.35 7.87 (0.000)***  5.94 7.59 (0.000)*** 
MTB 3.65 4.5 (0.001)***  3.54 4.31 (0.001)*** 
ROA -0.03 0.04 (0.000)***  -0.06 0.02 (0.000)*** 
LOSS 0.36 0.18 (0.000)***  0.41 0.23 (0.000)*** 
LEV 0.18 0.2 (0.012)**  0.17 0.19 (0.000)*** 
AR_INV 0.24 0.22 (0.000)***  0.25 0.22 (0.000)*** 
BIG4 0.87 0.94 (0.000)***  0.82 0.90 (0.000)*** 
AUD_IMPORT 0.08 0.10 (0.001)***  0.08 0.10 (0.000)*** 
IND_SPECIAL 0.25 0.27 (0.215)  0.23 0.23 (0.447) 
BUSSEG_SR 2.09 2.22 (0.000)***  2.06 2.17 (0.001)*** 
RESTRUCTURE 0.38 0.38 (0.400)  0.33 0.35 (0.145) 
M&A 0.05 0.06 (0.183)  0.05 0.05 (0.224) 
FOREIGN 0.34 0.37 (0.004)***  0.31 0.34 (0.020)** 
BDINDEP 0.78 0.79 (0.034)**  0.76 0.78 (0.000)*** 
BDSIZE  8.22 8.92 (0.000)***  7.82 8.58 (0.000)*** 
ACSIZE 3.50 3.64 (0.000)***  3.39 3.53 (0.000)*** 
NUM_AC 2.50 2.42 (0.002)***  2.52 2.39 (0.000)*** 
DIR_TENURE 6.98 7.25 (0.150)  6.68 6.85 (0.224) 
CO_AGE 2.75 2.89 (0.000)***     
SALES_GROWTH 0.34 0.19 (0.141)     
VOL_CF_OP     0.08 0.06 (0.018)** 
LAG_ABSDA     0.07 0.06 (0..000)*** 
        
Observations 1,105 1,024     1,447 1,332   
Notes: This table presents a test of differences in means between higher reputation incentive firms (HIGH_REP = 1) and firms that are not high 
reputation incentive firms (HIGH_REP = 0) in a director's portfolio of audit committee seats.  All variables are defined as in Appendix A. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided).  
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Table 4 
Main Multivariate Analysis 
Panel A                 
  Column 1     Column 2 
  MISSTATE       HIGH_FSCORE   
VARIABLES coef p-value       coef p-value   
Constant 0.402 (0.000) ***  0.082 (0.356)  
HIGH_REP -0.004 (0.714)       -0.027 (0.089) * 
SIZE 0.013 (0.518)    0.035 (0.000) *** 
MTB 0.001 (0.630)    -0.001 (0.038) ** 
ROA 0.030 (0.323)    -0.034 (0.334)  
LOSS 0.036 (0.002) ***  -0.029 (0.102)  
LEV 0.071 (0.058) *   0.190 (0.001) *** 
AR_INV 0.032 (0.597)    0.417 (0.000) *** 
BIG4 0.004 (0.849)    0.013 (0.629)  
AUD_IMPORT -0.079 (0.562)    0.014 (0.745)  
IND_SPECIALIST 0.021 (0.232)    0.003 (0.865)  
BUSSEG_SR -0.004 (0.693)    -0.010 (0.176)  
RESTRUCTURE 0.019 (0.278)    -0.036 (0.021) ** 
M&A 0.008 (0.766)    0.130 (0.000) ***	
FOREIGN 0.033 (0.344)    -0.007 (0.616) *** 
BDINDEP -0.063 (0.281)    -0.221 (0.001) ***	
BDSIZE  -0.002 (0.739)    -0.001 (0.851)  
ACSIZE -0.008 (0.479)    -0.015 (0.072) *	
NUM_AC 0.004 (0.819)    0.010 (0.499)  
DIR_TENURE 0.002 (0.137)    0.000 (0.677)  
         
Year FE  Yes     Yes  
Industry FE  Yes     Yes  
Director FE  Yes     Yes  
Adj R-Squared  0.14     0.23  
Observations   3,140 		 		     2,747 		
Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation (1). Column 1 presents a linear probability 
model examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the 
likelihood of a misstatement, MISSTATE. Column 2 presents a linear probability model examining the 
effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the likelihood that the firm's 
F-Score is greater than 1.85, HIGH_FSCORE. P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 




Table 4 Continued 
Main Multivariate Analysis 
Panel B       
  MWEAK 
VARIABLES coef p-value   
Constant 0.034 (0.720)  
HIGH_REP -0.021 (0.061) * 
SIZE 0.011 (0.174)  
MTB 0.000 (0.698)  
ROA -0.056 (0.283)  
LOSS 0.027 (0.096) * 
LEV 0.067 (0.097) * 
AR_INV 0.039 (0.528)  
BIG4 0.000 (0.798)  
AUD_IMPORT 0.045 (0.181)  
IND_SPECIALIST 0.015 (0.356)  
BUSSEG_SR -0.015 (0.023) ** 
RESTRUCTURE 0.022 (0.171)  
M&A 0.013 (0.499)  
FOREIGN 0.018 (0.187)  
BDINDEP -0.055 (0.289)  
BDSIZE  -0.003 (0.281)  
ACSIZE 0.011 (0.581)  
NUM_AC -0.003 (0.943)  
DIR_TENURE -0.001 (0.027) **	
CO_AGE 0.020 (0.023) **	
SALES_GROWTH 0.001 (0.691)  
    
Year FE  Yes  
Industry FE  Yes  
Director FE  Yes  
Adj R-Squared  0.15  
Observations   2,129 		
Notes: Panel B presents the results from estimating Equation (2) using a linear probability model. The 
model examines the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the 
likelihood of a material weakness in internal controls over financial reporting, MWEAK. P-values 
reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-sided). All variables are 
defined as in Appendix A.  
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Table 4 Continued 
Main Multivariate Analysis 
Panel C          
		 ABSDA  
VARIABLES coef p-value    
Constant 0.030 (0.031) ***  
HIGH_REP -0.004 (0.094) *  
SIZE -0.003 (0.037) **  
MTB 0.000 (0.483)   
ROA 0.014 (0.079) *  
LOSS -0.003 (0.299) *  
LEV 0.020 (0.004) ***  
AR_INV 0.026 (0.015)   
BIG4 0.001 (0.828)   
AUD_IMPORT 0.018 (0.002) ***  
IND_SPECIALIST 0.001 (0.534)   
BUSSEG_SR -0.002 (0.015) **  
RESTRUCTURE -0.003 (0.272)   
M&A 0.001 (0.742)   
FOREIGN -0.001 (0.650)   
BDINDEP -0.009 (0.289)   
BDSIZE  0.002 (0.026) **	 	
ACSIZE -0.002 (0.270)   
NUM_AC -0.001 (0.807)   
DIR_TENURE 0.000 (0.483)   
VOL_CFO 0.073 (0.003) ***	 	
LAG_ABSDA 0.037 (0.096) *	 	
     
     
Year FE  Yes   
Industry FE  Yes   
Director FE  Yes   
Adj R-Squared  0.17   
Observations   2,779   
Notes: Panel C presents the results from estimating Equation (3) using an OLS model. The model examines 
the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the absolute value of 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, ABSDA. P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 






Director Descriptive Statistics by Busyness Level 
 
 
Directors with Two Audit Committee 
Seats 		 		 		 		
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
NUM_AC 2.00 2.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 
NUM_HIGH_REP 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
PROP_HIGH_REP 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 
NUM_NOT_HIGH_REP 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
PROP_NOT_HIGH_REP 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 
      
Director-Year Observations 1,041 		 		 		 		
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for director-years in which the director holds two audit 
committee seats. All variables are defined as in Appendix A 
      
      
Directors with Three or More Audit Committee 
Seats 		 		 		
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
NUM_AC 3.21 3.00 0.49 3.00 3.00 
NUM_HIGH_REP 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
PROP_HIGH_REP 0.32 0.33 0.04 0.33 0.33 
NUM_NOT_HIGH_REP 2.21 2.00 0.49 2.00 2.00 
PROP_NOT_HIGH_REP 0.68 0.67 0.04 0.67 0.67 
      
Director-Year Observations 452 		 		 		 		
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for director-years in which the director holds three or more 






Busyness Level Interaction Analysis 
Panel A 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
  Column 1   Column 2 
  MISSTATE   HIGH_FSCORE 
VARIABLES coef p-value    coef p-value   
Constant 0.467 (0.000) ***  0.051 (0.607)  
HIGH_REP -0.006 (0.657)   -0.021 (0.247)  
THREE_OR_MORE 0.058 (0.099) *	 	 -0.018 (0.643)  
HIGH_REP*THREE_OR_MORE 0.005 (0.766) 		   -0.017 (0.444)   
SIZE 0.001 (0.948)   0.058 (0.001) *** 
MTB -0.001 (0.699)   -0.002 (0.064) * 
ROA 0.054 (0.180)   -0.033 (0.452)  
LOSS 0.074 (0.009) ***  -0.027 (0.098) * 
LEV 0.078 (0.047) **  0.184 (0.001) *** 
AR_INV 0.063 (0.239)   0.402 (0.000) *** 
BIG4 -0.014 (0.650)   0.020 (0.529)  
AUD_IMPORT -0.035 (0.401)   0.014 (0.748)  
IND_SPECIALIST 0.032 (0.250)   0.002 (0.874)  
BUSSEG_SR -0.011 (0.519)   -0.011 (0.172)  
RESTRUCTURE 0.014 (0.585)   -0.036 (0.021) ** 
M&A -0.038 (0.418)   0.130 (0.000) ***	
FOREIGN 0.018 (0.276)   -0.006 (0.592)  
BDINDEP -0.015 (0.866)   -0.222 (0.001) ***	
BDSIZE  -0.003 (0.637)   -0.001 (0.883)  
ACSIZE -0.002 (0.925)   -0.015 (0.070) *	
DIR_TENURE 0.001 (0.669)   0.000 (0.695)  
        
Year FE  Yes    Yes  
Industry FE  Yes    Yes  
Director FE  Yes    Yes  
Adj R-Squared  0.14    0.23  
Observations   3,140       2,747 		
Joint Test of Coefficients 		 		 		 		       
Coefficients coef p-value     coef p-value   
 a1 + a3 = 0 -0.001 (0.950)   -0.038 (0.160)  
Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation (1) using a linear probability model. It examines 
the moderating effect of the director's level of busyness on the effect of HIGH_REP on FRQ. P-values reported 
in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 





Table 6 Continued 
Busyness Level Interaction Analysis 
Panel B 		 		 		
  MWEAK 
VARIABLES coef p-value   
Constant -0.018 (0.936)  
HIGH_REP -0.020 (0.068) * 
THREE_OR_MORE 0.008 (0.735)  
HIGH_REP*THREE_OR_MORE -0.009 (0.639)   
SIZE -0.011 (0.553)  
MTB 0.001 (0.713)  
ROA -0.113 (0.199)  
LOSS 0.026 (0.387)  
LEV 0.098 (0.211)  
AR_INV 0.078 (0.442)  
BIG4 -0.006 (0.859)  
AUD_IMPORT 0.075 (0.265)  
IND_SPECIALIST 0.032 (0.181)  
BUSSEG_SR -0.042 (0.005) *** 
RESTRUCTURE 0.036 (0.183)  
M&A 0.037 (0.446)  
FOREIGN 0.002 (0.925)  
BDINDEP -0.096 (0.296)  
BDSIZE  0.002 (0.761)  
ACSIZE 0.020 (0.178)  
DIR_TENURE 0.001 (0.506)  
CO_AGE 0.020 (0.022) **	
SALES_GROWTH -0.001 (0.366)  
    
Year FE  Yes  
Industry FE  Yes  
Director FE  Yes  
Adj R-Squared  0.15  
Observations   2,129   
Joint Test of Coefficients 		 		 		
Coefficients coef p- value   
b1 + b3 = 0 -0.029 (0.060) * 
Notes: Panel B presents the results from estimating Equation (2) using a linear probability model. It 
examines the moderating effect of the director's level of busyness on the effect of HIGH_REP on FRQ. 
P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-sided). All variables are 
defined as in Appendix A. 
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Table 6 Continued 
Busyness Level Interaction Analysis 
Panel C 		 		 		
	 ABSDA 
VARIABLES coef p-value   
Constant 0.016 (0.316)  
HIGH_REP -0.004 (0.080) * 
THREE_OR_MORE -0.008 (0.213)  
HIGH_REP*THREE_OR_MORE 0.000 (0.951)   
SIZE -0.003 (0.043) ** 
MTB 0.001 (0.494)  
ROA 0.012 (0.093) * 
LOSS -0.004 (0.290)  
LEV 0.020 (0.004) *** 
AR_INV 0.027 (0.012) ** 
BIG4 0.001 (0.817)  
AUD_IMPORT 0.018 (0.002) *** 
IND_SPECIALIST 0.000 (0.552)  
BUSSEG_SR -0.003 (0.015) ** 
RESTRUCTURE -0.002 (0.285)  
M&A 0.014 (0.186)  
FOREIGN -0.002 (0.554)  
BDINDEP -0.002 (0.903)  
BDSIZE  0.002 (0.026) **	
ACSIZE -0.001 (0.807)  
DIR_TENURE -0.001 (0.309)  
VOL_CFO 0.072 (0.003) ***	
LAG_ABSDA 0.037 (0.094) *	
	    
Year FE  Yes  
Industry FE  Yes  
Director FE  Yes  
Adj R-Squared  0.17  
Observations   2,779   
Joint Test of Coefficients 		 		 		
Coefficients coef p- value   
c1 + c3 = 0 -0.004 (0.098) * 
Notes: Panel C presents the results from estimating Equation (3) using an OLS model. It examines the 
moderating effect of the director's level of busyness on the effect of HIGH_REP on FRQ. P-values 
reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-sided). All variables are defined 




Director-Firm-Year Descriptive Statistics on Tenure 
MISSTATE SAMPLE 		 		 		 		 		
Variable Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 25% 75% 
EARLY_TENURE 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
      
Director-Firm-Year Observations 3,140 		 		 		 		
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for director-firm-years in the MISSTATE sample All variables are 
defined as in Appendix A 
      
F_SCORE SAMPLE 		 		 		 		 		
Variable Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 25% 75% 
EARLY_TENURE 0.27 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
      
Director-Firm-Year Observations 2,747 		 		 		 		
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for director-firm-years in the FSCORE sample All variables are 
defined as in Appendix A 
      
      
MWEAK SAMPLE 		 		 		 		 		
Variable Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 25% 75% 
EARLY_TENURE 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 
      
Director-Firm-Year Observations 2,129 		 		 		 		
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for director-firm-years in the MWEAK sample All variables are 
defined as in Appendix A 
      
      
ABSDA SAMPLE 		 		 		 		 		
Variable Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 25% 75% 
EARLY_TENURE 0.29 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
      
Director-Firm-Year Observations 2,779 		 		 		 		
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for director-firm-years in the ABSDA sample All variables are 








Early Tenure Interaction Analysis 
Panel A 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
  Column 1   Column 2 
  MISSTATE   HIGH_FSCORE 
VARIABLES coef p-value     coef p-value   
Constant 0.392 (0.000) ***  0.087 (0.322)  
HIGH_REP -0.001 (0.931)   -0.020 (0.228)  
EARLY_TENURE 0.005 (0.759)   0.012 (0.568)  
HIGH_REP*EARLY_TENURE -0.012 (0.560) 		   -0.021 (0.415)   
SIZE 0.002 (0.905)   0.055 (0.000) *** 
MTB -0.001 (0.716)   -0.002 (0.091) * 
ROA 0.053 (0.192)   -0.030 (0.490)  
LOSS 0.074 (0.003) ***  -0.025 (0.256)  
LEV 0.077 (0.047) **  0.118 (0.110)  
AR_INV 0.175 (0.229)   0.390 (0.000) *** 
BIG4 -0.015 (0.645)   0.022 (0.514)  
AUD_IMPORT -0.185 (0.385)   0.103 (0.176)  
IND_SPECIALIST 0.032 (0.243)   0.053 (0.033) ** 
BUSSEG_SR -0.011 (0.514)   -0.013 (0.205)  
RESTRUCTURE 0.014 (0.590)   -0.042 (0.113)  
M&A -0.037 (0.420)   0.081 (0.097) *	
FOREIGN 0.066 (0.279)   -0.008 (0.652)  
BDINDEP -0.014 (0.879)   -0.233 (0.008) ***	
BDSIZE  -0.003 (0.646)   0.006 (0.369)  
ACSIZE -0.003 (0.901)   -0.018 (0.198)  
NUM_AC 0.015 (0.607)   -0.018 (0.414)  
        
Year FE  Yes    Yes  
Industry FE  Yes    Yes  
Director FE  Yes    Yes  
Adj R-Squared  0.14    0.23  
Observations   3,140       2,747 		
Joint Test of Coefficients 		 		 		         
Coefficients coef p- value     coef p- value   
 a1 + a3 = 0 -0.013 (0.509)     -0.041 (0.116)   
Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation (1) using a linear probability model. It examines the 
moderating effect of the tenure of the director on the effect of HIGH_REP on FRQ. P-values reported in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-sided). All variables are defined as in Appendix A.  
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Table 8 Continued 
Early Tenure Interaction Analysis 
Panel B   
  MWEAK 
VARIABLES coef p-value   
Constant -0.075 (0.710)  
HIGH_REP -0.020 (0.085) * 
EARLY_TENURE 0.032 (0.092) * 
HIGH_REP*EARLY_TENURE -0.016 (0.531)   
SIZE -0.016 (0.384)  
MTB 0.001 (0.730)  
ROA -0.111 (0.209)  
LOSS 0.024 (0.429)  
LEV 0.097 (0.224)  
AR_INV 0.074 (0.467)  
BIG4 -0.007 (0.827)  
AUD_IMPORT 0.074 (0.273)  
IND_SPECIALIST 0.034 (0.162)  
BUSSEG_SR -0.016 (0.028) ** 
RESTRUCTURE 0.038 (0.164)  
M&A 0.040 (0.402)  
FOREIGN 0.003 (0.906)  
BDINDEP -0.098 (0.284)  
BDSIZE  0.001 (0.822)  
ACSIZE 0.002 (0.175)  
NUM_AC 0.020 (0.831)  
CO_AGE 0.022 (0.015) **	
SALES_GROWTH 0.001 (0.744)  
    
Year FE  Yes  
Industry FE  Yes  
Director FE  Yes  
Adj R-Squared  0.14  
Observations   2,129   
Joint Test of Coefficients 		 		 		
Coefficients coef p- value   
 b1 + b3 = 0 -0.036 (0.089) * 
Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation (2) using a linear probability model. It 
examines the moderating effect of the tenure of the director on the effect of HIGH_REP on FRQ. P-values 
reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-sided). All variables are defined as 
in Appendix A.  
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Table 8 Continued 
Early Tenure Interaction Analysis 
Panel C       
  ABSDA 
VARIABLES coef p-value   
Constant 0.030 (0.188)  
HIGH_REP -0.004 (0.085) * 
EARLY_TENURE 0.003 (0.338)  
HIGH_REP*EARLY_TENURE 0.000 (0.925)   
SIZE -0.001 (0.878)  
MTB 0.001 (0.039) ** 
ROA 0.013 (0.168)  
LOSS -0.005 (0.305)  
LEV -0.002 (0.848)  
AR_INV 0.030 (0.098) * 
BIG4 0.009 (0.077) * 
AUD_IMPORT 0.041 (0.006) *** 
IND_SPECIALIST 0.000 (0.954)  
BUSSEG_SR -0.002 (0.182)  
RESTRUCTURE -0.007 (0.077) *	
M&A 0.015 (0.085) * 
FOREIGN -0.002 (0.615)  
BDINDEP -0.001 (0.912)  
BDSIZE  -0.001 (0.797)  
ACSIZE -0.001 (0.904)  
NUM_AC -0.003 (0.747)  
VOL_CFO 0.137 (0.000) ***	
LAG_ABSDA 0.076 (0.001) ***	
	    
Year FE  Yes  
Industry FE  Yes  
Director FE  Yes  
Adj R-Squared  0.17  
Observations   2,779   
Joint Test of Coefficients 		 		 		
Coefficients coef p- value   
 c1 + c3 = 0 -0.004 (0.093) * 
Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation (3) using an OLS model. It examines the 
moderating effect of the tenure of the director on the effect of HIGH_REP on FRQ. P-values reported in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-sided). All variables are defined as in 





Panel A                 
  Column 1     Column 2 
  MISSTATE       MISSTATE   
VARIABLES coef p-value       coef p-value   
Constant 0.385 (0.000) ***   0.300 (0.001) *** 
HIGH_REP_20 -0.005 (0.727)             
HIGH_REP_50           0.021 (0.216)   
SIZE 0.010 (0.414)    -0.002 (0.847)  
MTB 0.001 (0.972)    -0.001 (0.202)  
ROA 0.017 (0.166)    0.016 (0.555)  
LOSS 0.040 (0.005) ***   0.025 (0.148)  
LEV 0.100 (0.034) **   -0.035 (0.370)  
AR_INV 0.165 (0.163)    0.005 (0.926)  
BIG4 0.019 (0.466)    0.024 (0.199)  
AUD_IMPORT -0.052 (0.217)    -0.077 (0.056) * 
IND_SPECIALIST 0.003 (0.824)    -0.001 (0.993)  
BUSSEG_SR 0.001 (0.866)    0.003 (0.434)  
RESTRUCTURE -0.001 (0.530)    -0.009 (0.665)  
M&A 0.000 (0.997)    -0.011 (0.747)  
FOREIGN 0.066 (0.939)    0.031 (0.043) ** 
BDINDEP -0.031 (0.164)    -0.022 (0.742)  
BDSIZE  -0.002 (0.702)    -0.001 (0.855)  
ACSIZE -0.012 (0.538)    -0.008 (0.456)  
NUM_AC -0.011 (0.615)    -0.007 (0.739)  
DIR_TENURE 0.000 (0.519)    0.001 (0.579)  
         
Year FE  Yes     Yes  
Industry FE  Yes     Yes  
Director FE  Yes     Yes  
Adj R-Squared  0.13     0.12  
Observations   3,012 		 		     2,357 		
Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation (1) using different thresholds for the main 
variable of interest, HIGH_REP. Columns 1 and 2 present linear probability models examining the effect 
of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the likelihood of a misstatement, 
MISSTATE. Columns 1 and 2 use a 20% relative size threshold and a 50% relative size threshold, 
respectively, to measure HIGH_REP. P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 





Table 9 Continued 
Threshold Analysis 
Panel B 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
  Column 1     Column 2 
  HIGH_FSCORE       HIGH_FSCORE 
VARIABLES coef p-value       coef p-value   
Constant 0.091 (0.334)   0.071 (0.488)  
HIGH_REP_20 -0.028 (0.087) *           
HIGH_REP_50           -0.068 (0.081) * 
SIZE 0.036 (0.000) ***  0.035 (0.001) *** 
MTB -0.001 (0.033) **   -0.001 (0.067) * 
ROA -0.035 (0.345)    -0.029 (0.492)  
LOSS -0.031 (0.087) *   -0.025 (0.242)  
LEV 0.185 (0.011) **   0.155 (0.008) *** 
AR_INV 0.439 (0.000) ***  0.321 (0.000) *** 
BIG4 0.014 (0.613)    0.020 (0.530)  
AUD_IMPORT 0.083 (0.754)    0.100 (0.184)  
IND_SPECIALIST 0.019 (0.387)    0.016 (0.388)  
BUSSEG_SR -0.010 (0.196)    -0.012 (0.256)  
RESTRUCTURE -0.036 (0.019) **	 	  -0.039 (0.031) ** 
M&A 0.128 (0.000) ***	 	 0.101 (0.005) ***	
FOREIGN -0.011 (0.463)    -0.008 (0.646)  
BDINDEP -0.216 (0.002) **   -0.203 (0.005) ***	
BDSIZE  -0.001 (0.780)    0.001 (0.920)  
ACSIZE -0.017 (0.046) **   -0.018 (0.042) **	
NUM_AC 0.005 (0.723)    -0.013 (0.949)  
DIR_TENURE -0.001 (0.617)    0.000 (0.959)  
         
Year FE  Yes     Yes  
Industry FE  Yes     Yes  
Director FE  Yes     Yes  
Adj R-Squared  0.22     0.23  
Observations   2,632 		 		     2,052 		
Notes: Panel B presents the results from estimating Equation (1) using different thresholds for the main 
variable of interest, HIGH_REP. Columns 1 and 2 present linear probability models examining the 
effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the likelihood that the 
firm's F-Score is greater than 1.85, HIGH_FSCORE. Columns 1 and 2 use a 20% relative size threshold 
and a 50% relative size threshold, respectively, to measure HIGH_REP. P-values reported in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-sided). All variables are defined as in 
Appendix A. 
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Table 9 Continued 
Threshold Analysis 
Panel C                 
  Column 1   		 Column 2   
  MWEAK   		 MWEAK   
VARIABLES coef p-value     		 coef p-value   
Constant 0.001 (0.994)    0.128 (0.368)  
HIGH_REP_20 -0.025 (0.064) *   		       
HIGH_REP_50 		 		 		   		 -0.008 (0.051) * 
SIZE 0.012 (0.152)    0.020 (0.125)  
MTB 0.000 (0.744)    0.001 (0.678)  
ROA -0.046 (0.405)    -0.064 (0.386)  
LOSS 0.038 (0.110)    0.037 (0.096) * 
LEV 0.086 (0.068) *   0.038 (0.597)  
AR_INV 0.111 (0.122)    0.065 (0.426)  
BIG4 0.036 (0.242)    0.013 (0.772)  
AUD_IMPORT 0.065 (0.170)    0.043 (0.442)  
IND_SPECIALIST 0.018 (0.276)    0.068 (0.001)  
BUSSEG_SR -0.017 (0.023) **   -0.018 (0.034) *** 
RESTRUCTURE 0.027 (0.183)    0.032 (0.204)  
M&A -0.004 (0.876)    0.012 (0.600)  
FOREIGN 0.012 (0.939)    0.004 (0.870)  
BDINDEP -0.050 (0.424)    -0.069 (0.378)  
BDSIZE  -0.004 (0.392)    -0.005 (0.396)  
ACSIZE 0.007 (0.333)    0.015 (0.045) **	
NUM_AC -0.004 (0.861)    0.007 (0.802)  
DIR_TENURE -0.001 (0.516)    -0.001 (0.400)  
CO_AGE 0.022 (0.012) **	 	  0.010 (0.354)  
SALES_GROWTH 0.001 (0.537)    -0.005 (0.507)  
         
Year FE  Yes     Yes  
Industry FE  Yes     Yes  
Director FE  Yes     Yes  
Adj R-Squared  0.15     0.14  
Observations   2,013 		 		 		   1,508 		
Notes: Panel C presents the results from estimating Equation (2) using different thresholds for the main 
variable of interest, HIGH_REP. Columns 1 and 2 present linear probability models examining the effect 
of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the likelihood of a material 
weakness in internal controls over financial reporting, MWEAK. Columns 1 and 2 use a 20% relative size 
threshold and a 50% relative size threshold, respectively, to measure HIGH_REP. P-values reported in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 




Table 9 Continued 
Threshold Analysis 
Panel D         		 		 		 		
		 Column 1     Column 2 
		 ABSDA   		 		 ABSDA   
VARIABLES coef p-value     		 coef p-value   
Constant 0.029 (0.038) **   0.027 (0.116)  
HIGH_REP_20 -0.004 (0.065) *    		       
HIGH_REP_50         		 -0.008 (0.056) * 
SIZE -0.003 (0.033) **   -0.001 (0.376)  
MTB 0.000 (0.453)    0.001 (0.040) ** 
ROA 0.013 (0.143)    0.012 (0.840)  
LOSS -0.002 (0.570)    -0.004 (0.627)  
LEV 0.021 (0.003) ***   0.018 (0.036) ** 
AR_INV 0.025 (0.045) **   0.023 (0.057) * 
BIG4 0.002 (0.579)    0.008 (0.101)  
AUD_IMPORT 0.018 (0.005) ***   0.016 (0.026) ** 
IND_SPECIALIST -0.002 (0.538)    0.000 (0.925)  
BUSSEG_SR -0.022 (0.033) **   -0.002 (0.200)  
RESTRUCTURE -0.004 (0.122)    -0.008 (0.080) *	
M&A 0.005 (0.443)    0.014 (0.186)  
FOREIGN -0.002 (0.650)    -0.002 (0.401)  
BDINDEP -0.001 (0.438)    -0.002 (0.342)  
BDSIZE  0.002 (0.030) **	 	  0.002 (0.084) *	
ACSIZE -0.001 (0.952)    -0.001 (0.838)  
NUM_AC -0.005 (0.136)    -0.001 (0.473)  
DIR_TENURE -0.001 (0.125)    -0.001 (0.300)  
VOL_CFO 0.067 (0.006) ***	 	  0.095 (0.001) ***	
LAG_ABSDA 0.038 (0.111)    0.040 (0.172)  
         
Year FE  Yes     Yes  
Industry FE  Yes     Yes  
Director FE  Yes     Yes  
Adj R-Squared  0.17     0.14  
Observations   2,604 		 		 		   2,042  
Notes: Panel D presents the results from estimating Equation (3) using different thresholds for the main variable 
of interest, HIGH_REP. Columns 1 and 2 present OLS models examining the effect of the relative reputation 
incentives that a firm offers to the director on the absolute value of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, 
ABSDA. Columns 1 and 2 use a 20% relative size threshold and a 50% relative size threshold, respectively, to 
measure HIGH_REP. P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-sided). All 




Additional Misstatement Type Analysis 
   Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
    BIG_R BIG_R   BIG_R   
VARIABLES   coef p-value coef p-value   coef p-value   
HIGH_REP   0.001 (0.917)       		 		 		
HIGH_REP_20       -0.001 (0.972)         
HIGH_REP_50             0.012 (0.546)   
          
Intercept and Controls     Yes   Yes     Yes   
Year FE     Yes   Yes     Yes   
Industry FE   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Director FE     Yes   Yes     Yes   
Adj R-Squared     0.23   0.23     0.24   
Observations     3,140   3,012     2,357   
Notes:  This table presents the results from estimating Equation (1) using different thresholds for the main variable of interest, HIGH_REP. Columns 
1-3 present linear probability models examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the likelihood of a 
misstatement that is accompanied with an 8-K announcement, BIG_R. Column 1 uses a 10% relative size threshold to measure HIGH_REP, Column 
2 uses a 20% relative size threshold to measure HIGH_REP, and Column 3 uses a 50% threshold to measure HIGH_REP. Coefficients for control 
variables are suppressed for brevity. P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate 












F-Score Continuous Measure Analysis 
    Column 1 Column 2 Column 3  
    FSCORE   FSCORE   FSCORE    
VARIABLES   coef p-value   coef p-value   coef p-value    
HIGH_REP   -0.244 (0.089) *     		 		 		   
HIGH_REP_20         -0.266 (0.097) *         
HIGH_REP_50               -0.607 (0.071) * 
            
Intercept and Controls     Yes     Yes     Yes    
Year FE     Yes     Yes     Yes    
Industry FE   Yes    Yes   Yes   
Director FE     Yes     Yes     Yes    
Adj R-Squared     0.19     0.19     0.20    
Observations     2,747     2,632     2,052    
Notes:  This table presents the results from estimating Equation (1) using different thresholds for the main variable of interest, HIGH_REP. Columns 1-3 
present OLS models examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the continuous measure of the F-Score, 
FSCORE. Column 1 uses a 10% relative size threshold to measure HIGH_REP, Column 2 uses a 20% relative size threshold to measure HIGH_REP, and 
Column 3 uses a 50% threshold to measure HIGH_REP. P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and 












Firm Fixed Effects 
Panel A   Column 1   Column 2 Column 3 
    MISSTATE   MISSTATE   MISSTATE   
VARIABLES   coef p-value   coef p-value   coef p-value   
HIGH_REP   -0.020 (0.296)         		 		 		
HIGH_REP_20         -0.015 (0.501)         
HIGH_REP_50               0.010 (0.764)   
           
Intercept and Controls     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Year FE     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Firm FE   Yes     Yes   Yes  
Director FE     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Adj R-Squared     0.27     0.26     0.23   
Observations     3,140     3,012     2,357   
Notes:  Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation (1) using different thresholds for the main variable of interest, HIGH_REP. Columns 1-3 
present linear probability models examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the likelihood of a 
misstatement, MISSTATE. Column 1 uses a 10% relative size threshold to measure HIGH_REP, Column 2 uses a 20% relative size threshold to measure 
HIGH_REP, and Column 3 uses a 50% threshold to measure HIGH_REP. Coefficients for control variables are suppressed for brevity. The model is 
estimated using firm fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-sided). All variables are 










Table 12 Continued 
Firm Fixed Effects 
Panel B   Column 1   Column 2 Column 3 
    HIGH_FSCORE   HIGH_FSCORE   HIGH_FSCORE   
VARIABLES   coef p-value   coef p-value   coef p-value   
HIGH_REP   -0.023 (0.068) *       		 		 		
HIGH_REP_20         -0.020 (0.121)         
HIGH_REP_50               -0.048 (0.054) * 
           
Intercept and Controls     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Year FE     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Firm FE   Yes     Yes   Yes  
Director FE     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Adj R-Squared     0.26     0.28     0.33   
Observations     2,747     2,632     2,052   
Notes:  Panel B presents the results from estimating Equation (1) using different thresholds for the main variable of interest, HIGH_REP. Columns 1-3 
present linear probability models examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the likelihood that the firm's 
F-Score is greater than 1.85, HIGH_FSCORE. Column 1 uses a 10% relative size threshold to measure HIGH_REP, Column 2  uses a 20% relative size 
threshold to measure HIGH_REP, and Column 3 uses a 50% threshold to measure HIGH_REP. Coefficients for control variables are suppressed for 
brevity. The model is estimated using firm fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-











Table 12 Continued 
Firm Fixed Effects 
Panel C   Column 1   Column 2 Column 3 
    MWEAK   MWEAK   MWEAK   
VARIABLES   coef p-value   coef p-value   coef p-value   
HIGH_REP   -0.017 (0.449)         		 		 		
HIGH_REP_20         -0.029 (0.259)         
HIGH_REP_50               -0.043 (0.374)   
           
Intercept and Controls     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Year FE     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Firm FE   Yes     Yes   Yes  
Director FE     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Adj R-Squared     0.29     0.29     0.24   
Observations     2,129     2,013     1,508   
Notes:  Panel C presents the results from estimating Equation (1) using different thresholds for the main variable of interest, HIGH_REP. Columns 1-
3 present linear probability models examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the likelihood of a 
material weakness in internal controls over financial reporting, MWEAK. Column 1 uses a 10% relative size threshold to measure HIGH_REP, 
Column 2 uses a 20% relative size threshold to measure HIGH_REP, and Column 3 uses a 50% threshold to measure HIGH_REP. Coefficients for 
control variables are suppressed for brevity. The model is estimated using firm fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 












Table 12 Continued 
Firm Fixed Effects 
Panel D   Column 1   Column 2 Column 3 
    ABSDA   ABSDA   ABSDA   
VARIABLES   coef p-value   coef p-value   coef p-value   
HIGH_REP   -0.006 (0.094) *       		 		 		
HIGH_REP_20         -0.010 (0.021) **       
HIGH_REP_50               -0.027 (0.000) *** 
           
Intercept and Controls     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Year FE     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Firm FE   Yes     Yes   Yes  
Director FE     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Adj R-Squared     0.25     0.26     0.25   
Observations     2,779     2,604     2,042   
Notes:  Panel D presents the results from estimating Equation (1) using different thresholds for the main variable of interest, HIGH_REP. 
Columns 1-3 present OLS models examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the absolute 
value of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, ABSDA. Column 1 uses a 10% relative size threshold to measure HIGH_REP, Column 2 
uses a 20% relative size threshold to measure HIGH_REP, and Column 3 uses a 50% threshold to measure HIGH_REP. Coefficients for control 
variables are suppressed for brevity. The model is estimated using firm fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 












Continuous Measure of Reputation Incentives 
    Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 		 Column 4 
VARIABLES   MISSTATE HIGH_FSCORE MWEAK 		 ABSDA 
DIST_FROM_MEDIAN   0.012 (0.332)   -0.005 (0.073) * -0.004 (0.060) *	 -0.001 (0.065) * 
                    		       
                    		       
Intercept and Controls     Yes     Yes     Yes 		   Yes   
Year FE     Yes     Yes     Yes 		   Yes   
Industry FE     Yes     Yes     Yes 		   Yes   
Director FE     Yes     Yes     Yes 		   Yes   
Adj R-Squared     0.14     0.23     0.28 		   0.26   
Observations     3,140     2,747     2,129 		   2,779   
Notes: This table presents the results from estimating Equation (1)-(3) using a different measure of reputation incentives, DIST_FROM_MEDIAN. 
DIST_FROM_MEDIAN is defined as the difference between the SIZE variable of firm i and the median of the SIZE variable of all the firms that director 
d serves in year t. Columns 1-3 present linear probability models examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the 
director on FRQ. Column 4 presents an OLS model examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the 
FRQ.  P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-sided). All variables are defined as in Appendix A.  
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Table 14  
Means of HIGH_REP by Size Distribution 
Panel A 		 		 		 		 		
Lower Half 		 		 		 		 		
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
HIGH_REP 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
      
Observations 1,572 		 		 		 		
 Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for firms in the sample below or equal to the 
median of size. All variables are defined as in Appendix A 
      
Upper Half 		 		 		 		 		
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
HIGH_REP 0.66 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
      
Observations 1,568 		 		 		 		
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for firms in the sample above the median of size. 




























Table 14 Continued 
Means of HIGH_REP by Size Distribution 
Panel B 		 		 		 		 		
Bottom Tercile 		 		 		 		 		
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
HIGH_REP 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 
      
Observations 1,047 		 		 		 		
 Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for firms in the sample that are in the bottom tercile 
of size. All variables are defined as in Appendix A 
      
Middle Tercile 		 		 		 		 		
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
HIGH_REP 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
      
Observations 1,046 		 		 		 		
 Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for firms in the sample that are in the middle tercile 
of size. All variables are defined as in Appendix A 
      
Top Tercile 		 		 		 		 		
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
HIGH_REP 0.73 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
      
Observations 1,047 		 		 		 		
 Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for firms in the sample that are in the top tercile of 



















Size Distribution Analysis 
Panel A 		 Column 1 		 Column 2 		 Column 3 Column 4 
TOP HALF 		       		       		             
		   MISSTATE 		 HIGH_FSCORE 		 MWEAK ABSDA 
VARIABLES   coef p-value    coef p-value    coef p-value   coef p-value   
                
HIGH_REP   0.010 (0.648)   		 -0.019 (0.476)   		 0.010 (0.520)   -0.002 (0.504)   
                
Intercept and Controls Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes  
Industry FE Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes  
Year FE  Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes  
Director FE Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes  
Adj R-Squared  0.12    0.27    0.20   0.31  
Observations 		 1,049   		 		 908   		 		 674   		 903   
Notes: This table presents the results from estimating Equation (1)-(3) on a sample of directors that only serve companies in the top half of the 
distribution of firm size. Columns 1 and 2 present linear probability models examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm 
offers to the director on the likelihood of a misstatement, MISSTATE, and the likelihood that the firm's F-Score is greater than 1.85, 
HIGH_FSCORE, respectively. Column 3 presents a linear probability model examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm 
offers to the director on the likelihood of the firm having a material weakness in internal control, MWEAK. Column 4 presents an OLS model 
examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the absolute value of performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals, ABSDA. P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate 











Table 15 Continued 
Size Distribution Analysis 
Panel B 		 Column 1 		 Column 2 		 Column 3 Column 4 
BOTTOM HALF       		       		             
		   MISSTATE 		 HIGH_FSCORE 		 MWEAK ABSDA 
VARIABLES   coef p-value    coef p-value    coef p-value   coef p-value   
                
HIGH_REP   -0.033 (0.062) * -0.013 (0.653)   		 -0.068 (0.036) ** -0.010 (0.029) ** 
                
Intercept and Controls Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes  
Industry FE Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes  
Year FE  Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes  
Director FE Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes  
Adj R-Squared  0.238    0.262    0.189   0.204  
Observations 		 974   		 		 851   		 		 622   		 826   
Notes: This table presents the results from estimating Equation (1)-(3) on a sample of directors that only serve companies in the bottom half of the 
distribution of firm size. Columns 1 and 2 present linear probability models examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the 
director on the likelihood of a misstatement, MISSTATE, and the likelihood that the firm's F-Score is greater than 1.85, HIGH_FSCORE, respectively. 
Column 3 presents a linear probability model examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the likelihood of 
the firm having a material weakness in internal control, MWEAK. Column 4 presents an OLS model examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives 
that a firm offers to the director on the absolute value of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, ABSDA. P-values reported in parentheses are based on 
robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-sided). All variables 











Regressions by Tercile 
Panel A 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
TOP TERCILE 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
    Column 1 		 Column 2 		 Column 3 Column 4 
    MISSTATE   		 HIGH_FSCORE 		 MWEAK   ABSDA   
VARIABLES   coef p-value   		 Coef p-value 		 coef p-value   coef p-value   
HIGH_REP   -0.048 (0.222)   		 -0.026 (0.495) 		 -0.009 (0.444)   -0.001 (0.846)   
          		     		             
          		     		             
Intercept and Controls     Yes   		   Yes 		   Yes     Yes   
Year FE     Yes   		   Yes 		   Yes     Yes   
Industry FE     Yes   		   Yes 		   Yes     Yes   
Director FE     Yes   		   Yes 		   Yes     Yes   
Adj R-Squared     0.17   		   0.30 		   0.26     0.10   
Observations     562   		   493 		   368     479   
Notes: This table presents the results from estimating Equation (1) -(3) on a sample of directors that only serve companies in the top tercile of firm size. 
Columns 1 and 2 present linear probability models examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the 
likelihood of a misstatement, MISSTATE, and the likelihood that the firm's F-Score is greater than 1.85, HIGH_FSCORE, respectively. Column 3 presents 
a linear probability model examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the likelihood that the firm having a 
material weakness in internal control, MWEAK. Column 4 presents an OLS model examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm 
offers to the director on the absolute value of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, ABSDA. P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-sided). All variables are 









Table 16 Continued 
Regressions by Tercile 
Panel B 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
MIDDLE TERCILE 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
  		 Column 1     Column 2   Column 3   Column 4 		
    MISSTATE   		 HIGH_FSCORE 		 MWEAK   ABSDA   
VARIABLES   coef p-value   		 Coef p-value 		 coef p-value   coef p-value   
HIGH_REP   0.067 (0.272)   		 0.108 (0.206) 		 0.004 (0.959)   0.003 (0.775)   
          		     		             
          		     		             
Intercept and Controls     Yes   		   Yes 		   Yes     Yes   
Year FE     Yes   		   Yes 		   Yes     Yes   
Industry FE     Yes   		   Yes 		   Yes     Yes   
Director FE     Yes   		   Yes 		   Yes     Yes   
Adj R-Squared     0.30   		   0.40 		   0.59     0.25   
Observations     330   		   304 		   249     310   
Notes: Panel B presents the results from estimating Equation (1) -(3) on a sample of directors that only serve companies in the middle tercile of firm size. 
Columns 1 and 2 present linear probability models examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the 
likelihood of a misstatement, MISSTATE, and the likelihood that the firm's F-Score is greater than 1.85, HIGH_FSCORE, respectively. Column 3 
presents a linear probability model examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the likelihood that the 
firm having a material weakness in internal control, MWEAK. Column 4 presents an OLS model examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives 
that a firm offers to the director on the absolute value of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, ABSDA. P-values reported in parentheses are based 
on robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-sided). All 







Table 16 Continued 
Regressions by Tercile 
Panel C 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
BOTTOM TERCILE 		 Column 1 		 Column 2 		 Column 3 		 Column 4 
    MISSTATE 		 HIGH_FSCORE 		 MWEAK 		 ABSDA 
VARIABLES   coef p-value   		 Coef p-value 		 coef p-value   		 coef p-value   
HIGH_REP   -0.064 (0.027) ** -0.025 (0.766) 		 -0.062 (0.087) * -0.001 (0.078) * 
          		     		       		       
          		     		       		       
Intercept and Controls     Yes   		   Yes 		   Yes   		   Yes   
Year FE     Yes   		   Yes 		   Yes   		   Yes   
Industry FE     Yes   		   Yes 		   Yes   		   Yes   
Director FE     Yes   		   Yes 		   Yes   		   Yes   
Adj R-Squared     0.30   		   0.38 		   0.47   		   0.28   
Observations     480   		   428 		   334   		   403   
Notes: Panel C presents the results from estimating Equation (1) -(3) on a sample of directors that only serve companies in the bottom tercile of firm size. 
Columns 1 and 2 present linear probability models examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the likelihood 
of a misstatement, MISSTATE, and the likelihood that the firm's F-Score is greater than 1.85, HIGH_FSCORE, respectively. Column 3 presents a linear 
probability model examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the director on the likelihood that the firm having a material 
weakness in internal control, MWEAK. Column 4 presents an OLS model examining the effect of the relative reputation incentives that a firm offers to the 
director on the absolute value of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, ABSDA. P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-sided). All variables are defined as in 












Descriptive Statistics on the Addition of Audit Committee Seats by Directors 
 








Director-Year Observations 29,791 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics on the addition of board seats by directors 
  
  






Director-Firm-Year Observations 1,012 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics on the addition of board seats by directors 
  






Director-Firm-Year Observations 508 
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